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STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DEFENSE IN 
CYBERSPACE: A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR 
BALANCING LEGAL RIGHTS 
Catherine Lotrionte∗ 
Today’s threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and 
must be addressed at the global and regional as well as the national 
levels.1 
When warranted, [the United States] will respond to hostile acts in 
cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country. All states 
possess an inherent right to self-defense . . . . [We recognize] that 
hostile acts conducted through cyberspace could compel actions 
under the commitments we have with our military treaty 
partners . . . .2 
America must also face the rapidly growing threat from cyber-
attacks. Now, we know hackers steal people’s identities and infiltrate 
private emails. We know foreign countries and companies swipe our 
corporate secrets. Now our enemies are also seeking the ability to 
sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions, and our air traffic 
control systems. We cannot look back years from now and wonder 
why we did nothing in the face of real threats to our security and our 
economy.3 
 
 ∗ Catherine Lotrionte is the Director of the Institute for Law, Science & Global Security and Visiting 
Assistant Professor of Government at Georgetown University. Dr. Lotrionte has served as Counsel to the 
President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board at the White House and as Assistant General Counsel at the 
Central Intelligence Agency. Dr. Lotrionte is the Director and Founder of the Cyber Project at Georgetown 
University and a Life Member of the Council on Foreign Relations. 
 1 Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our 
Shared Responsibility, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter U.N. Report, A More Secure 
World].  
 2 DEP’T OF DEF., CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT 2, 7 (2011) [hereinafter CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT]. 
 3 Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013) (discussing the threats the United States 
faces from adversaries in cyber and noting the Executive Order that President Obama signed earlier in the day, 
Executive Order on Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, designed to strengthen U.S. cyber 
defenses through information sharing and standards for cyber security); see also Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 
Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 12, 2013). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Few issues in international relations are as controversial as the use of force 
and the legal framework that justifies a state’s use of force in self-defense. 
Indeed, the very development of the discipline in international law lies in 
attempts by states, the United Nations, and international courts to wrestle with 
the question of when force may legitimately be used within the international 
realm. Over the centuries, states have struggled to define the right to use force 
as they face new threats from new actors and new weapons entering the arena 
of conflict. 
This Article grapples with the contemporary topic of when a state can 
invoke forcible measures in cyberspace against non-state actors. To address 
this issue, this Article discusses the current threats to states that exist in 
cyberspace, identifies the international law on the use of force and discusses 
recent state practice as well as the pronouncements of international courts on 
the topic. Difficult questions in the context of cyber operations are posed and 
challenging conclusions are drawn from the development of the law. 
Ultimately, this Article provides a framework for state decision-makers to use 
to determine whether the state can legally use force in self-defense in 
cyberspace against non-state actors residing in another state’s territory. 
Overall, it is an indication of the increasing maturity of international law that it 
is capable of facing up to the complex challenges of these new threats while 
continuing to search for the path forward that maintains and enhances the rule 
of law and minimizes conflict within the international community. 
It is clear that “cyber warfare” is not a technical legal term and it has been 
argued by some to be even misleading and unhelpful.4 There is a concern by 
some that the term will glorify those criminals responsible for most malicious 
action in the cyber domain, exaggerate the threat, and distort the understanding 
of particular conflicts that take place in cyberspace, just as the use of the term 
“war on terror” arguably has done. Regardless, the rhetoric of “cyber warfare” 
has some significance for the law on the use of force because it can be used to 
justify the use of self-defense against other states and non-state actors accused 
of carrying out a cyber attack against a state. 
Today, state officials from around the globe warn that a state’s most critical 
infrastructure—power plants, gas pipelines, traffic control systems, and water 
 
 4 See, e.g., Cyber Security and International Law: Meeting Summary, CHATHAM HOUSE 3 (May 29, 
2012) (summary of remarks by Mary Ellen O’Connell). 
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treatment plants—are at risk of attack by adversaries.5 Military and intelligence 
officials have repeatedly warned that malicious hackers could disrupt critical 
infrastructure with the click of a mouse, causing severe economic loss, 
persistent blackouts or even mass casualties.6 The issue of how to protect the 
state from such attacks, internationally, has not been resolved, leaving 
significant differences between states, and between commentators, on this 
issue. 
In March 2003, the United States argued that Iraq was developing weapons 
of mass destruction, and undertook Operation Iraqi Freedom. The invasion of 
Iraq was bitterly contested internationally. After the invasion, U.N. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan spoke of “a fork in the road” and declared that “this may 
be a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the U.N. was founded.”7 
Questions were raised about the effectiveness of the United Nations, and 
international law more generally, to deal with new threats. Some states, like the 
United States, seemed to argue that states were no longer obliged to wait until 
there was agreement in the Security Council before acting unilaterally or in ad 
hoc coalitions against the terrorist threats.8 This position represented a 
fundamental change to the principles on which world peace and stability have 
been based for the last fifty-eight years under the U.N. Charter framework. 
In response, the Secretary-General set up a High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, to examine global peace and security issues, identify 
how collective security may address these threats, and recommend changes 
that may be needed. In 2004 the group issued its report, A More Secure World.9 
In 2005 the Secretary-General issued his own report, In Larger Freedom.10 In 
all of these instruments there was a recognition that the nature of twenty-first 
century threats had changed such that even the most powerful states were 
vulnerable.11 However, the consensus from all of the reports was that no 
change in the U.N. Charter provisions on the use of force was needed. The 
long-established prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) and the right of 
 
 5 Obama, supra note 3. 
 6 See text accompanying notes 32–57. 
 7 U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 7th plen. mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. A/58/PV.7 (Sept. 23, 2003). 
 8 See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 25 
(2002). 
 9 Supra note 1. 
 10 U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for 
All, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom]. 
 11 U.N. Report, A More Secure World, supra note 1, at 11. 
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self-defense in Article 51 were adequate to meet the new threats.12 
Nevertheless, international law on the use of force, its content, application, and 
effectiveness in dealing with the cyber threats has been the object of much 
debate. 
Indeed, cyber instability poses the same challenge to international peace 
and security as the threats of terrorism, transnational organized crime, poverty, 
infectious diseases, environmental degradation, and nuclear, biological 
chemical, and radiological weapons, as outlined in the U.N. reports.13 If 
consensus on the rules related to the use of force in cyberspace is not achieved, 
the result will be a self-help system within the cyber domain, with potential 
spillover into the kinetic sphere. Within this domain mistrust will dominate, 
and opportunities for cooperation for long-term stability and mutual gain will 
be lost. 
The principles related to the use of force have long helped—although not 
perfectly—world peace and stability. They stand firmly against aggression,14 
facilitate a minimum level of order, and can facilitate a stable basis for 
exchange, agreement, human creativity, and innovative opportunity in 
cyberspace. This Article argues that, given the central importance of stability 
for all states in the cyber domain, the international community must work to 
preserve the normative principles of jus ad bellum and find opportunities to 
apply these principles in the cyber context. States must work towards a 
harmonization of what each state understands to be a use of force in 
cyberspace. Agreement over the contours of sovereignty and self-defense in 
cyberspace will allow states to develop common terminology, improve 
predictability, and manage potential crises in the cyber domain. 
I. THE CHALLENGES: PRINCIPLES OF SOVEREIGNTY AND  
SELF-DEFENSE COLLIDE 
The challenge in reaching such a new security consensus among states in 
the cyber domain is multifaceted. First, states may disagree about the nature of 
the threat in the cyber realm. How one defines the threat will dictate the 
mechanisms adopted to address the threats. A state may view the cyber threats 
 
 12 U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 10, at 39; U.N. Report, A More Secure World, supra note 1, at 55. 
 13 U.N. Report, A More Secure World, supra note 1, at 38–40 (discussing the threats of weapons of mass 
destruction, terrorism, and transnational organized crime). 
 14 Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to Transnational Terrorism Under the Jus Ad Bellum: A Normative 
Framework, 56 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 3 (2008). 
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to be of a criminal nature, carried out by individual hackers, or organized 
criminal organizations committing fraud and stealing identities online. In this 
case, the view would be to use criminal law enforcement mechanisms to 
address the threat. Those that perceive the threat to be a challenge to national 
power and sovereignty would argue that such a threat requires a response to 
defend the nation itself. 
Second, in cyberspace as in other spaces, states remain sovereign, with 
rights fully recognized in the U.N. Charter. Even if states recognize the 
severity and agree on the nature of the cyber threats, they will likely not 
surrender their fundamental rights. States will still have all the rights of 
statehood to include the ability to determine whether and to what extent the 
state will engage with the international community on any security issues. 
Third, states will maintain the right to exercise self-defense in the cyber 
domain, as in the domains of air, land, and sea.15 The cyber domain will not be 
any different from the other domains in which states have always maintained 
the right to protect their security. If a use of force is determined to be necessary 
for their security, states may use force in the cyber context as they would in 
other domains. 
States will remain sovereign in cyberspace. As set forth in the Island of 
Palmas case, the principle of “[s]overeignty in the relations between States 
signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the 
right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a 
State.”16 By signing the U.N. Charter, states not only benefit from the 
privileges of sovereignty but also accept certain responsibilities, which include 
avoiding harm to other states.17 However, a state’s right of sovereignty and its 
obligation to do no harm, at times, exist in tension. In the cyber context, states 
exercise sovereign control over cyber infrastructure and cyber operations 
located within their territory, including the right to limit access to the Internet 
from within the state.18 This same principle of sovereignty also includes an 
obligation by states to respect the sovereignty of other states, including their 
 
 15 In 2011, the U.S. government officially stated its position on a State’s right of self-defense in the cyber 
domain, noting that, “[c]onsistent with the United Nations Charter, states have an inherent right to self-defense 
that may be triggered by certain aggressive acts in cyberspace.” See WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL 
STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE 10 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 INTERNATIONAL CYBERSPACE STRATEGY]. 
 16 Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). 
 17 E.g., U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 18 NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR.OF EXCELLENCE, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed.) (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript r. 1, para. 10) 
[hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL], available at http://issuu.com/nato_ccd_coe/docs/tallinn_manual_draft.  
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territorial integrity.19 As the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) held in the 
Nicaragua case, “[b]etween independent States, respect for territorial 
sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations.”20 In the cyber 
context, states have an obligation to prevent their cyber infrastructure from 
being used by others to harm another state.21 
Cyber operations against another state’s territorial infrastructure can violate 
a state’s sovereignty.22 Historically, the ICJ has ruled that a state has the right 
of control over its territory and that other states cannot interfere in the 
territorial state’s freedom to maintain exclusive and independent control over 
that territory. In the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ found that Great Britain had 
violated the sovereignty of Albania by not obtaining Albania’s permission 
before conducting a mine sweeping exercise in Albanian territorial seas.23 In 
addition to violations of a state’s sovereignty, depending upon the “scale and 
effect” of a cyber operation, it could constitute an “intervention,” a “use of 
force,” or an “armed attack.”24 All of these designations are international 
wrongful acts. 
States will maintain the right to use force in self-defense in cyberspace. Just 
as the U.N. Charter recognizes a state’s right of sovereignty, the Charter and 
customary international law fully recognize a state’s right of self-defense 
against threats.25 The state’s right to use force in self-defense, however, is 
contingent on the nature of the threat.26 Certainly, if a state has been the victim 
of an armed attack from another state, the victim state has the right to use force 
in self-defense against the aggressor state.27 If a cyber attack is launched from 
State A and harms State B, the sovereignty of State B has been violated. State 
A still maintains a right of sovereignty. State B, however, also may have the 
right of self-defense against State A. In this case, the right of sovereignty of 
State A is in conflict with State B’s right of self-defense. 
 
 19 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 
I.C.J. 14, para. 202 (June 27). 
 20 Id. 
 21 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 18 (manuscript r. 5, para. 3). 
 22 See id. 
 23 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 36 (Apr. 9). 
 24 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 195; see also 
U.N. Charter art. 2 (noting a prohibition on use of force and intervention); id. art. 51 (noting the right of self-
defense in response to armed attack). 
 25 U.N. Charter arts. 2, 51. 
 26 Id. art. 51. 
 27 See id. 
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What if, however, a state has been the victim of a cyber attack by a non-
state actor operating from within another state’s territory? To what extent can 
the victim state use force within the state where the non-state actor is 
operating? What is the level of responsibility of the target state for the non-
state actor’s actions? Unfortunately, both in conventional warfare and in the 
cyber context, international law has not provided a clear standard for when a 
victim state may use force in self-defense against a non-state actor. As the 
U.N. report, A More Secure World, urged, “[t]he norms governing the use of 
force by non-State actors have not kept pace with those pertaining to 
States. . . . The United Nations must achieve the same degree of normative 
strength concerning non-State use of force as it has concerning State use of 
force.”28 
In the cyber domain, where non-state actors can hide with impunity in the 
territory of a state and launch attacks against other states, states currently lack 
effective international legal guidance to inform their decisions about using 
force. This Article explores the roles and responsibilities of states to preserve 
the fundamental principles of international law that exist to promote stability, 
security, and peace in the cyber context. By describing how these principles 
are being challenged today by non-state actors, this Article offers some sense 
of how the principles of sovereignty and self-defense can co-exist, holding 
non-state actors accountable, holding states responsible, making victim states 
safer, and making cyberspace more stable. 
There is a significant consensus that international law governs activities in 
cyberspace and that states maintain sovereignty rights as well as the right to 
defend against threats in cyberspace.29 What is less certain is whether, in acting 
to preserve these rights, states will be well-enough informed to make decisions 
that not only preserve these rights but also reduce conflict in cyberspace and 
minimize the opportunity for escalation. Where the international rules in 
cyberspace are not yet firmly established, decisions related to the 
circumstances under which a state will use force in cyberspace will be dictated 
by state practice and customary international law.30 This customary practice 
will take time as states consider options and consequences. In the meantime, as 
such practice begins to develop, this Article recommends a number of 
 
 28 U.N. Report, A More Secure World, supra note 1, at 48. 
 29 See, e.g., infra notes 134–153 and accompanying text. 
 30 See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, International Law in Cyberspace, 
Remarks at USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012) (transcript available at http:// 
www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm). 
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practical, and hopefully, effective criteria for one standard that states could 
consider when making determinations about when to use force in the context 
of cyber attacks from non-state actors. In proposing the standard, the ultimate 
goals of this Article are to increase the security of the cyber domain, minimize 
the use of force in the domain, provide more predictability of action and 
uphold the central principles of international law. This Article’s intent is to 
propose a standard that may guide states in honoring the principles of 
sovereignty, preserving the right of self-defense, and making informed 
decisions related to national security matters in cyberspace. 
II. BENEFITS OF A STANDARD FOR ASSESSING WHEN TO USE FORCE IN 
RESPONSE TO NON-STATE ACTORS 
There are a number of potential benefits to adopting a standard like the one 
proposed in this Article. The standard offered in this Article is based on 
fundamental principles of international law and would likely be supported by 
other states that recognize the same normative principles. Offering a standard 
that is likely to gain early acceptance at least among like-minded states would 
help the idea to be recognized quickly by as many states as possible. A 
standard such as the one this Article proposes can be discussed publicly to gain 
international agreement on the standard’s meaning. This allows for ex post 
facto assessments of the state’s actions in using force. If the U.N. Security 
Council or an international court were to review a state’s actions ex post facto, 
a state that uses a clear standard to determine whether the use of force was 
appropriate creates a factual record with unambiguous points of reference that 
would be uniformly understood by all parties. It may also improve the 
likelihood that the state’s actions will be viewed as legal and legitimate in the 
eyes of the international community or court. 
Particularly for those states that see themselves as victim states with respect 
to uses of force or armed attacks in cyberspace, a standard against which to 
evaluate possible responses to cyber attacks would provide the state with a 
useful decision-making tool, as well as a learning instrument that can be 
changed as new circumstances may call for repeated use of the standard. This 
allows a state to learn over time with repeated iterative use of a standard. As 
there are more instances when states invoke the standard in their decisions to 
use force in the cyber context, this will provide more opportunities for the 
standard to be tested. With more use, the standard will likely gather more 
international acceptance, particularly if the perception is that the stated 
objectives of the standard were upheld, minimizing conflict and improving 
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stability and peace in cyberspace. State practice may ultimately coalesce 
around the standard creating more predictability in cyberspace. 
III.  THE THREATS FACED IN CYBERSPACE 
In June 2010, the then-incoming Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, 
testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that “the next Pearl 
Harbor that we confront could very well be a cyberattack.”31 On October 11, 
2012, Secretary Panetta gave a speech in New York discussing the Department 
of Defense’s responsibility in cyber-security, describing the threat as a “cyber 
Pearl Harbor.”32 He provided examples of specific scenarios where a cyber 
attack could result in physical destruction and loss of life, paralyze and shock 
the nation, and create a profound new sense of vulnerability.33 He likened the 
cyber threats to terrorism, nuclear weapons proliferation, and the turmoil in the 
Middle East,34 the same threats the previously mentioned U.N. reports 
identified as challenging the basic principles of international relations.35 Most 
recently, in a speech at Georgetown University, on February 6, 2013, Panetta 
sounded the alarm about cyber attacks against the United States, describing 
how foreign cyber actors are probing critical infrastructure and creating “tools 
to attack these systems and cause panic and destruction and even the loss of 
life.”36 His speech came on the heels of recent cyber attacks on The New York 
Times,37 U.S. financial institutions, and the state oil companies of Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar.38 
The United States’ 2010 National Security Strategy cited cyber threats as 
“one of the most serious national security, public safety, and economic 
 
 31 Anna Mulrine, CIA Chief Leon Panetta: The Next Pearl Harbor Could Be a Cyberattack, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR (June 9, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/0609/CIA-chief-Leon-Panetta-
The-next-Pearl-Harbor-could-be-a-cyberattack. 
 32 Sec’y of Def. Leon E. Panetta, Remarks on Cybersecurity to the Business Executives for National 
Security (Oct. 11, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx? 
transcriptid=5136).  
 33 Id.  
 34 Id.  
 35 U.N. Report, A More Secure World, supra note 1, at 38–40. 
 36 See Panetta Delivers Sharp Warning About Cyber Attacks, WASH. FREE BEACON (Feb. 6, 2013 10:26 
AM), http://freebeacon.com/panetta-delivers-sharp-warning-about-cyber-attacks/. 
 37 See Nicole Perlroth, Hackers in China Attacked The Times for Last 4 Months, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
2013, at A1. 
 38 See Saudi Arabia Says Cyber Attack Aimed to Disrupt Oil, Gas Flow, REUTERS, Dec. 9, 2012, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/09/saudi-attack-idUSL5E8N91UE20121209. 
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challenges we face as a nation.”39 The report described how “[t]he very 
technologies that empower us to lead and create also empower those who 
would disrupt and destroy.”40 Certainly, the growth of cyber technology has 
been a significant driver for economic growth. Unfortunately, it has also been a 
catalyst for new vulnerabilities for modern society. Cyberspace has 
empowered people to conduct business across borders in seconds, run power 
plants through centralized control systems, and even coordinate the movements 
of troops in distant locations while simultaneously creating new and dangerous 
opportunities for adversaries to attack these very same operations.41 As with 
the technologies of the past, the advances in cyber technology, while originally 
designed to improve life, are being transformed into instruments for 
aggression. 
As networked computers have proliferated, so too have the threat vectors 
for potential hacker groups and non-state actors to exploit for economic or 
political gain.42 From the theft of individuals’ bank account information to a 
disastrous piece of malware destroying an electrical grid, states and non-state 
actors have the ability to wreak serious damage on individuals or states alike 
around the globe with just the click of a mouse.43 These changes in technology 
have heralded a new security climate for states—one where opportunities for 
cooperation exist but are matched with an unprecedented scope for destruction. 
Within this new environment, there is a growing recognition by a number of 
states, including the United States, of the need to work through international 
channels in order to establish security in cyberspace to maintain its benefits for 
all.44 
On May 16, 2011, President Barack Obama released the United States’ 
International Strategy for Cyberspace.45 In recognizing the challenges posed 
by malevolent actors who threaten the security of the Internet, President 
Obama called upon states to “work towards building the rule of law, to prevent 
the risks of logging on from outweighing its benefits.”46 In its 2009 
 
 39 WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 27 (2010). 
 40 Id. 
 41 RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY 
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 97–101 (2010). 
 42 WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW 1 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 CYBERSPACE POLICY 
REVIEW], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf. 
 43 JEFFREY CARR, INSIDE CYBER WARFARE 1–14 (2d ed. 2012). 
 44 See 2009 CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 42, at iv. 
 45 2011 INTERNATIONAL CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 15. 
 46 Id. at 3. 
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Cyberspace Policy Review, the Obama administration had concluded that 
“[i]nternational norms are critical to establishing a secure and thriving digital 
infrastructure.”47 Most recently, in the State of the Union Address on January 
12, 2013, President Obama warned, “[E]nemies are also seeking the ability to 
sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions, and our air traffic control 
systems [in cyber].”48 The President called upon the Congress to work to better 
secure the networks of the critical infrastructure upon which the United States 
depends. 
In July 2011, the Department of Defense released its Strategy for 
Operating in Cyberspace, noting that cyber attacks could constitute an act of 
war to which the United States would consider responding with kinetic force.49 
The report stated the U.S. position that the laws related to armed conflict were 
applicable to cyberspace, and inaugurated the notion of “equivalence” in 
cyberspace in response to significantly destructive attacks.50 In other words, if 
there is harmful action in the cyber domain, it can be met with a parallel 
response in another domain. In releasing the strategy, former Deputy Secretary 
of Defense William J. Lynn stated, “[T]he United States reserves the right, 
under the laws of armed conflict, to respond to serious cyber attacks with a 
proportional and justified military response at the time and place of our 
choosing.”51 
The Pentagon’s strategy also calls for international engagement concerning 
what cyber activities will be acceptable to states.52 In order to minimize the 
likelihood of inter-state confrontations, an international dialogue and 
consensus on the appropriate legal responses to threats in cyberspace will 
become all the more important as states consider kinetic responses to cyber 
attacks. 
On July 26, 2012, General Keith Alexander, the Commander of U.S. Cyber 
Command, gave the U.S. government’s first public remarks about the increase 
in pace of cyber attacks against the U.S. critical infrastructure.53 He described 
 
 47 2009 CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 42, at iv. 
 48 Obama, supra note 3. 
 49 CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT, supra note 2, at 2  
 50 Id. at 4–5. 
 51 William J. Lynn, III, Deputy Sec’y of Def., Remarks on the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy 
(July 14, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1593). 
 52 CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. 
 53 David Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Rise Is Seen in Cyberattacks Targeting U.S. Infrastructure, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 27, 2012, at A8. 
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the threat against the U.S. electric grids, water supplies, and banking networks. 
The New York Times cited General Alexander when it reported that “there 
ha[s] been a 17-fold increase in computer attacks on American infrastructure 
between 2009 and 2011, initiated by criminal gangs, hackers and other 
nations.”54 In the past, General Alexander has also drawn a distinction between 
what he called disruptive cyber attacks, such as denial-of-service attacks aimed 
at interrupting the flow of communication or finance, and destructive attacks 
designed to destroy parts of the network infrastructure of the United States, 
like routers and servers.55 According to General Alexander, a destructive cyber 
attack against critical infrastructure of the United States could be devastating.56 
These are the types of destructive attacks that have the potential to cause 
serious long-term damage to the national security of the United States.57 
The cyber operations against Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008, and Iran in 
2010 are three of the most recent and most public examples of cyber operations 
that call for an international cooperative approach—one that combines not only 
law enforcement, economic, and diplomatic measures but, when appropriate 
and necessary, military measures.58 The reality of the cyber domain is that 
states and non-state actors can and will use cyber weapons to threaten the 
security of other states. At times, a proportional use of force in response to 
cyber attacks may be necessary, which would implicate the international laws 
related to the use of force. 
A. The Role of International Law 
The rapidly changing structure and undergirding technologies of the global 
system over the last decade have brought international legal issues to the 
 
 54 Id. 
 55 Cheryl Pellerin, U.S. Leaders Cite Partnership as Key to Cybersecurity, AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE 
(Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118074 (quoting General Alexander as 
saying “Over the last few weeks, we’ve seen distributed denial-of-service attacks, so we’re seeing the threat 
grow from exploitation to . . . disruption, and my concern is it’s going to go from exploitation and disruption to 
destruction” (alteration in original)); see also John T. Bennett, NSA General on Cyberattacks: ‘Probability for 
a Crisis is Mounting,’ U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 9, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/dotmil/ 
2012/07/09/nsa-general-on-cyberattacks-probability-for-a-crisis-is-mounting. 
 56 Pellerin, supra note 55; see also Bennett, supra note 55.  
 57 See CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT, supra note 2, at 3–4. 
 58 A Look at Estonia’s Cyber Attack in 2007, MSNBC, July 8, 2009, available at http://www. 
msnbc.msn.com/id/31801246/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/look-estonias-cyber-attack; Parisa Hafezi, 
Iran Admits Cyber Attack on Nuclear Plants, REUTERS, Nov. 29, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2010/11/29/us-iran-idUSTRE6AS4MU20101129; John Swain, Georgia: Russian ‘Conducting Cyber 
War,’ TELEGRAPH (Aug. 11, 2008, 11:11 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/ 
2539157/Georgia-Russia-conducting-cyber-war.html. 
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forefront of national policy and international relations in a variety of fields. 
Cyberspace is no exception. Virtually every international issue from weapons 
of mass destruction,59 torture,60 and cybercrime61 to environmental 
protection,62 airline safety,63 and trade barriers,64 is governed by some aspect 
of international law—whether negotiated agreements, multilateral regimes, or 
norms of behavior. There is no aspect of international relations that 
international law does not impact in some way. International law not only 
protects the status quo, it reflects the aspiration for a stable and productive 
world order in the face of emerging threats. In the cyber domain, as has long 
been the case with other domains such as land, air, sea, and space,65 
international law will be a necessary instrument to ensure both international 
peace and the security and operability of the Internet across national borders. 
Cyber conflict is an emerging form of warfare not yet explicitly addressed 
by international law.66 Much of the current international law related to conflict 
was developed at a time when states were the only actors to commit acts of 
aggression with conventional weapons.67 Since the end of the Cold War, 
however, the international community has become acutely aware that the 
nature of threats in the international community has changed.68 New weapons 
 
 59 E.g., Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21 
U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970). 
 60 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 
1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 61 E.g., Convention on Cybercrime, opened for signature Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. No. 185 (entered into 
force Jan. 7, 2004) (Council of Europe). 
 62 E.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done May 9, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. 
No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994). 
 63 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S 295.  
 64 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
 65 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 397; UNITED 
NATIONS TREATIES AND PRINCIPLES ON OUTER SPACE, U.N. Doc. ST/SPACE/11, U.N. Sales No. E.02.I.20 
(1992) (reprinting several U.N. treaties and principles concerning outer space, which set forth the basic 
parameters for the military use of space, banning weapons of mass destruction, weapons testing, the 
establishment of military installations in outer space, and forbidding any state from claiming sovereignty over 
any celestial body). 
 66 See Kenneth Anderson, Why a Cybersecurity Treaty is a Pipe Dream, and a Better Approach for New 
Conflict Technologies, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 29, 2011, 11:16 AM) http://www.volokh.com/2011/10/29/ 
why-a-cybersecurity-treaty-is-a-pipedream-and-a-better-approach-for-new-conflict-technologies. 
 67 DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 52 (3d ed. 2010) (“It used to be that States 
were the only recognized subjects of international law, the only ‘real’ players on the international scene.”); see 
also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 119 (2nd Cir. 2010) (describing how, after the 
Nuremburg Trials, states were no longer the sole focus of international law), cert. granted, 132 S.Ct. 472 
(2011); cf. U.N. Charter art. 3 (opening membership to states, not individuals or organizations). 
 68 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (acknowledging changing threats to 
international peace after September 11, 2001). 
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such as nuclear weapons and new non-state actors such as terrorists have 
emerged on the global scene and, at times, have threatened international 
security.69 International organizations and courts have responded to these new 
threats by applying existing international laws and, when necessary, 
developing new law.70 The same should be done with cyber threats, whether 
the cyber threat emerges from states or non-state actors. As the White House 
Cyber Strategy states: “The development of norms for State conduct in 
cyberspace does not require a reinvention of customary international law, nor 
does it render existing international norms obsolete. Long-standing 
international norms guiding state behavior—in times of peace and conflict—
also apply in cyberspace.”71 This Article follows in this vein as it seeks to 
further develop the norm of state responsibility with respect to non-state actors 
in cyber conflict. 
Some international legal scholars have argued that cyber security should be 
regulated by those international laws related to economic and communication 
issues rather than by those that regulate military conflict.72 Indeed, most of the 
contested operations in cyber have been acts of cyber crime, identity and 
intelligence property theft, and espionage—both economic espionage and 
classic political espionage.73 These activities are currently regulated by 
domestic state laws and, to some extent, international law.74 There have been 
 
 69 See Nicholas Watt, Pakistan Boasted of Nuclear Strike on India Within Eight Seconds, GUARDIAN 
(June 15, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/15/pakistan-boasted-nuclear-strike-pakistan 
(illustrating ongoing tension as a result of nuclear weapons). See generally Chair of Security Council 
Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001), Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive 
Directorate, Global Survey of the Implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), transmitted by 
letter dated Aug. 17, 2011 from the Chair of the Security Council Comm. addressed to the Secretary-General 
of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc S/2011/463 (Sept. 1, 2011). 
 70 Cf. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ASPECTS OF COUNTERING TERRORISM 95–99 (2009), available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/ 
Publications/FAQ/English.pdf (describing U.N. guidance to States on reconciling human rights and counter-
terrorism measures). 
 71 2011 INTERNATIONAL CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 15, at 9. 
 72 See, e.g., CYBER SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: MEETING SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 3 
(remarks of Mary Ellen O’Connell). 
 73 MARTIN C. LIBICKI, CRISIS AND ESCALATION IN CYBERSPACE (2012). 
 74 The U.S. has criminalized a number of activities related to cyber crime and espionage. See Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006); Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 
(2006) (listing criminal prohibitions against economic espionage); Convention on Cyber Crime, Nov. 23, 
2001, C.E.T.S. No. 185, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm. The Convention on Cyber 
Crime was the first international treaty that criminalized specific computer crimes. Forty-seven States are 
signatories to the Convention. Espionage, universally criminal under domestic laws, does not ipso facto violate 
international law. See ABRAM N. SHULSKY, SILENT WARFARE: UNDERSTANDING THE WORLD OF INTELLIGENCE 
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relatively few instances of cyber conflict compared to the instances of cyber 
crime and espionage.75 This Article addresses cyber conflict and not the 
broader topic of cyber security in the context of telecommunications laws, 
criminal law, economics or privacy law.76 This is not to minimize the damage 
that can be done to a state from cyber crime or espionage. Government and 
industry experts have illustrated the tremendous losses from organized criminal 
activities in cyberspace as well as state-run cyber espionage operations against 
the United States.77 However, the international laws that control state uses of 
force, the focus of this Article, do not regulate crime or espionage. 
This Article focuses on those cyber threats that challenge the very 
independence, national power and viability of a state. This Article does not 
challenge the position that the Internet is and will remain, hopefully, a place 
for communication, commerce and innovation. This Article recognizes that the 
Internet will also be a place where states maintain sovereignty and continue to 
exercise the fundamental right to act in self-defense when threatened. Due to 
the lack of agreement on the applicability of the rules related to the use of force 
in cyber, it is imperative to conduct a review of these international principles, 
to analyze their application in cyber, and to use these principles to build a 
consensus about appropriate behavior in the cyber domain. 
 
103 (2d ed. 1993); Sean P. Kanuck, Recent Development, Information Warfare: New Challenges for Public 
International Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 272, 289 (1996).  
 75 Most experts estimate that there have been three to four cases of cyber conflict: the distributed denial-
of-service (“DDoS”) attacks against Estonia in 2007, the attacks against Georgia in 2008, the Stuxnet worm 
targeting Iran in 2009 and 2010, and the Israeli cyber attack against the Syrian radar defense system prior to an 
air strike against a nuclear reactor in 2007. See LIBICKI, supra note 73, at 16.  
 76 See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 18. The Tallinn Manual looks at how international law norms apply 
to cyber warfare. Its author’s pays particular attention to jus ad bellum, the international law governing the 
resort to force by States as an instrument of their national policy, and jus in bello, the international law 
regulating the conduct of armed conflict). See generally The Tallinn Manual, CCDCOE, http://ccdcoe.org/249. 
html (last visited Feb. 19, 2013).  
 77 PONEMON INST., 2012 COST OF CYBER CRIME STUDY 5 (2012) (finding that the average annualized 
cost of cyber crime for fifty-six organizations was $8.9 million per year, a six percent increase from the study 
results from the previous year). For a discussion on the negative impact of economic espionage on the United 
States, see OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., FOREIGN SPIES STEALING US ECONOMIC 
SECRETS IN CYBERSPACE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL 
ESPIONAGE, 2009–2011 (2011). See also MIKE ROGERS & DUTCH RUPPERSBERG, PERM. SELECT COMM. ON 
INTELLIGENCE, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES HUAWEI AND ZTE (2012) (accusing two of China’s largest 
telecommunications companies, Huawei Technologies and ZTE Inc., of stealing intellectual property from 
American companies and identifying them as potential vehicles for the Chinese government to spy against the 
United States). 
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The international laws related to the use of force are more fully developed 
in the case of direct acts by a state.78 However, for non-state actors who carry 
out armed attacks against states, there is more than a century of state practice 
that suggests that it is lawful for a victim state to use force against a non-state 
actor, even if that non-state actor is in another state’s territory, as long as the 
host state is unwilling or unable to stop the threat posed by the non-state 
actor.79 By responding to the threat in the territory of another state, the victim 
state exercises its right of self-defense, holding that state responsible for the 
harm it suffered. Where the law is less clear, and what this Article hopes to 
shed light on, is the appropriate standard the victim state should consider when 
making the determination to use force in another state’s territory, targeting 
non-state actors who have attacked the victim state. 
In response to those who would prefer that policymakers and international 
lawyers reject a military approach to the threats in cyberspace, this Article 
argues that failing to analyze the relevant international laws related to military 
conflict in light of the threats would be irresponsible. States will respond in 
self-defense against those cyber threats that threaten national security, as they 
have done for centuries against conventional kinetic threats.80 To recognize 
this is not to conclude that cyber security is fundamentally concerned solely 
with military security. Rather, it is to acknowledge the contemporary 
importance of “cyber warfare.” By assessing the normative structure of jus ad 
bellum under the U.N. Charter, analyzing the principles of use of force 
decisions by international courts, and applying these principles to the cyber 
context, this Article argues that these norms can serve to minimize military 
conflict in cyberspace. 
By assessing how the laws of international and non-international armed 
conflict relate to conflict in the cyber domain, this Article attempts to provide 
some clarity to the debate over a state’s legal authority to take action in the 
cyber domain in self-defense and, thereby, promote peace and security in the 
cyber realm. Ultimately, this Article searches for common criteria that states 
should use to decide when the use of force is justified. The very purpose of the 
international rules described in this Article, which have widespread 
international support, is to promote international peace and security in the 
context of conventional warfare whether on land, sea, air, or space. Nothing 
 
 78 BEDERMAN, supra note 67, at 72. 
 79 W. Michael Reisman, Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 
279, 282 (1985); see also BEDERMAN, supra note 67, at 232. 
 80 See BEDERMAN, supra note 67, at 232–35. 
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ought to prevent these same rules from providing the same benefits to states 
acting in the cyber realm. 
Indeed, international organizations, like the U.N. Security Council, can 
play a central role in managing these conflicts, defining legal uses of force and 
unlawful acts of aggression in the cyber domain, and identifying when states 
can be held accountable for the unlawful actions of non-state actors in their 
territory. International principles contained in treaties such as the U.N. Charter 
and in customary law can be applied to non-state actors, as well as to states, to 
maintain international peace and security and minimize the potential for 
international conflict in cyber. If the ICJ has the opportunity to address issues 
of uses of force in the cyber domain, it will need to carefully consider the 
evidence (even though evidence may be difficult to find and assess)81 of acts of 
aggression in cyberspace, whether by states or non-state actors, with or without 
state support. To maintain international peace and security in the cyber 
domain, the court will need to support a state’s right of self-defense against 
such acts of aggression. If the court fails to do this, not only will the legitimacy 
of the court be questioned, but it will have failed to act on the opportunity to 
bring some stability in the cyber domain. If cases of cyber uses of force come 
before the court, the court’s conclusions must be based on both traditional 
international law and the reality of the threats to international stability that 
exist today. 
Realistically, most progress in establishing principles in this area will not 
develop from ICJ decisions but from the practice of individual states, at times 
acting unilaterally, but hopefully working with other states as well. States, as 
the primary actors in making international law, must actively seek to develop 
standards that can be applied under international law in the cyber domain. 
International law develops primarily through international agreements and 
state practice.82 Therefore, especially if the United Nations or the international 
civil or criminal courts do not take the lead in this area, or if their rulings are 
not effective, it will be up to states to define what those standards will be. The 
development of normative standards in this area could be through explicit or 
 
 81 See Deb Shinder, What Makes Cybercrime Laws So Difficult To Enforce?, TECH REPUBLIC (Jan. 26, 
2011, 12:05 PM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/security/what-makes-cybercrime-laws-so-difficult-to-
enforce/4997 (describing the difficulty of obtaining evidence of cybercrime); see also DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 
191–207 (2009) (discussing evidentiary issues in cybercrime cases). 
 82 See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public 
Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1800 (2009) (describing the rules of international law as created “primarily 
through treaties entered into by states or by customary state practice”). 
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implicit agreements between states and, potentially, with Security Council 
engagement.83 As states seek international agreement on these norms, this 
Article proposes an informal standard that states can consider employing when 
they make decisions about uses of force in the cyber domain. 
These or other agreed-upon standards between states would help reduce 
violent, dangerous conflict in the cyber domain. In practice, they could serve as 
useful guideposts for victim and target states in a domain where much is not 
easily visible, uncertainty is guaranteed, and non-state actors are likely to 
remain important players. In the world today, non-state actors continue 
actively to threaten states’ national security through cyberspace,84 and those 
non-state actors and their state supporters know how to take advantage of the 
limited ability of victim states to prove attribution with one hundred percent 
certainty.85 It is therefore critical that states responding to those threats proceed 
carefully in the face of clear, balanced rules that have the legitimacy of 
international acceptance. 
The transnational nature of cyber operations and their potentially 
destructive results raise new and important issues regarding state responsibility 
under international law. Perhaps the most important of these new issues is 
whether governments must prevent cyber activities by non-state actors within 
their borders that cause injury to other states. Similar to other transnational 
activities, computer networks within a state’s territory are subject to state 
control.86 Two conclusions follow from this. First, if states have control over 
these activities, one must determine the level of state responsibility for such 
 
 83 There are number of on-going diplomatic efforts through the U.N. Governmental Group of Experts, 
established under the General Assembly, as well as bilateral efforts with the Russians and Chinese in 
particular. Russia, China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, have jointly proposed a “code of conduct” with regard to 
“the rights and responsibilities of States in information space.” Letter dated 12 September 2011 from the 
Permanent Representatives of China, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/66/359 (Sept. 14, 2011). 
 84 See Financial Cybercrime a National Security Threat, U.S. Department of Justice Official Warns, 
REUTERS, Sept. 21, 2012, available at http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2012/09/21/ 
financial-cybercrime-a-national-security-threat-u-s-justice-department-official-warns (equating attacks on U.S. 
banks with attacks on U.S. national security); Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Protect the 
Financial System and Strategic Markets Against Transnational Organized Crime, NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime/financial-system (last visited Oct. 26, 2012) 
(describing cybercrime as a threat to U.S. security). 
 85 See Susan W. Brenner, “At Light Speed”: Attribution and Response to 
Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINALITY 379, 409–29 (2007) (explaining the difficulty 
of attributing cyber attacks to a particular attacker). 
 86 See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS 
WORLD 65−86 (2006). 
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activities when they are destructive to others. When and how should the state 
be held responsible? What factors will be weighed to determine ultimate state 
responsibility? These questions must be answered uniformly, especially when 
states consider using kinetic force in response to malicious cyber actions in 
their territory. In the absence of these agreed-upon standards, there is a risk of 
arbitrary response decisions that could have catastrophic consequences, 
including escalation of conflict in cyberspace. Second, state control implies the 
need for state cooperation and international engagement among states to 
achieve effective global cyber security norms. 
To achieve stability in the cyber domain, it is paramount that engagement 
takes place at the government level with the involvement of key non-
governmental players. Efforts to harmonize domestic legislation, improve law 
enforcement collaboration, and socialize norms of state responsibility for cyber 
security are some of the fundamental first steps to ensuring the Internet 
remains open, reliable, and secure. Unlike the domains of land, sea, and air that 
are controlled exclusively by states and international organizations, cyberspace 
is dependent upon non-governmental organizations, private sector 
corporations, and individuals for its overall functionality.87 Several different 
groups need a seat at the table with states to create international stability and 
security in the cyberspace: corporations like Google; international nonprofit 
corporations; organizations like the Internet Society, the Internet Engineering 
Task Force, and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(“ICANN”), which develops the Internet’s technical protocols and standards; 
and computer security experts. The absence of these entities from the decision-
making process would deprive cyber security development efforts of key 
players and their needed expertise.88 This evolution of international private-
public cooperation will, therefore, have profound and unique impacts on the 
practical development of the state responsibility norm in the cyber domain. 
Although these international Internet governance bodies will be important 
partners in ensuring Internet security, their ability to influence the behavior of 
state actors is limited. These organizations lack any formal lawmaking 
authority and often have difficult relationships with states, making the 
development and acceptance of norms promulgated by these organizations 
 
 87 See, e.g., Zoë Baird, Governing the Internet: Engaging Government, Business and Non-Profits, 
FOREIGN AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2002, at 18 (describing the key role of ICANN in the functioning of the Internet). 
 88 Cf. Greg Rattray The Emerging Global Information Infrastructure and National Security, 21 
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 81, 95 (1997). 
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challenging.89 Because states will continue to exercise sovereignty in the cyber 
domain, it is critical to engage with the state actors to begin to define what 
acceptable behavior is in that domain. Key states will be the critical actors in 
establishing principles for cyber conflict and international law is the 
appropriate framework that will guide state behavior in cyberspace. 
Today international laws do not specifically address the rules related to 
state action and a state’s responsibility in cyberspace. These laws will 
ultimately be shaped by state practice. By drawing upon already well-
established international norms related to conflict however, and further 
developing norms such as state responsibility, states can develop lasting rules 
for conduct in cyberspace that contribute to improved world order. 
B. The Cyber Domain Under International Law: How Sovereignty Remains 
Relevant 
Some analysts have compared the Internet to either a global public good or 
a global commons.90 While both comparisons have relevant implications for 
cyber activities under international law, and therefore are useful comparisons 
in the cyber context, both terms ought to be recognized as imperfect 
applications in the cyber domain. Public goods are commodities that are non-
rival and non-excludable—that is to say, there is zero cost associated with 
extending the service to an additional person, and it is impossible or expensive 
to exclude individuals from enjoying it.91 Because these goods benefit 
everyone, only the government can typically provide these goods and benefits 
to the public. Any private company that may have had an interest in providing 
such goods to the public quickly recognizes its inability to charge for the goods 
and therefore loses any interest in providing the goods. 
While the cyber domain and access to the Internet are similar to public 
goods in that they are readily available to everyone at little-to-no cost, the 
 
 89 Eric Engleman, Commerce Department Keeps ICANN as Web’s Address Manager, BLOOMBERG (July 
3, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-02/u-s-commerce-department-retains-icann-as-web-s-
address-manager.html (describing tense negotiations between the U.S. government and ICANN).  
 90 JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE FUTURE OF POWER 143 (2011) (describing the Internet as a public good); see 
also Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The American National Interest and Global Public Goods, 78 INT’L AFF. 233, 241 
(2002); Gregory J. Rattray, Chris Evans, & Jason Healey, American Security in the Cyber Commons, in 
CONTESTED COMMONS: THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POWER IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD 137–76 (Abraham M. 
Denmark & James Mulvenon eds., 2010) (discussing whether cyberspace can be considered a global 
commons). 
 91 Rattray, Evans & Healey, supra note 90, at 14–15. 
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physical infrastructure of the Internet can be costly to develop and maintain 
securely.92 Importantly, this infrastructure can be physically located within 
sovereign states that have the ability to disconnect from the Internet (e.g., 
China’s Great Firewall), preventing access for many.93 The principle of 
sovereignty implies that a state has the right to control access to its territory, 
and therefore, can limit any Internet access within its sovereign territory. Such 
a capability undermines the Internet’s designation as a commons—something 
that cannot be owned by one person. Unlike the high seas, which are a “pure” 
commons for all humanity and are not controlled by any one state,94 the cyber 
domain is an “imperfect commons”95 over which states have sovereign 
authority to exclude others and enforce domestic rules that have an impact on 
the Internet beyond its borders. 
As an “imperfect public good,” ensuring the availability and security of the 
Internet is a complex problem to deal with under international agreements, 
where global exclusion is difficult and exploitation by one party can subtract 
value for other parties and threaten the national security of states.96 Providing 
security for this complex system will ultimately require state involvement, but 
the danger is that governmental protection may lead to fragmentation of the 
Internet where states decide to wall themselves off from the Internet in an 
attempt to insulate their societies from the dangers that travel through the 
Internet.97 China, for instance, has developed the ability to disconnect from the 
Internet if attacked and still operate internally on its own domestic form of the 
Internet.98 The United States may also be developing plans to maintain the 
ability to disconnect from the Internet.99 
 
 92 Ross Anderson, Why Internet Security Is Hard—An Economic Perspective, ANN. COMPUTER SEC. 
APPLICATIONS CONF. (2001) (describing Internet security in the context of the global commons). 
 93 Katia Moskovich, Cracks in the Wall: Will China’s Great Wall Crack, BBC NEWS (May 1, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-17910953. 
 94 HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS (James Brown Scott ed., Ralph van Deman Magoffin 
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1916) (1663).  
 95 NYE, supra note 90, at 143. 
 96 Id. (stating that cyberspace is an “‘imperfect commons’ or a condominium of joint ownership without 
well-developed rules.”). 
 97 A number of States have developed the capability to disconnect from the Internet. Examples of States 
that have been able to at least partially shut down Internet access are: Buram during the attempted revolution 
in 2008; China in 2009 after the riots in the province of Xinjiang; Iran in 2009 during the post-election Green 
Movement protests; and Syria in June 2011 during protests against the government. REBECCA MACKINNON, 
CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED 51–52 (2012). 
 98 CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 41, at 146. 
 99 Declan McCullagh, Renewed Push To Give Obama an Internet “Kill Switch,” CBS NEWS (Jan. 24, 
2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-501465_162-20029302-501465.html (noting that the proposed 
legislation that would have contained the “kill switch” authority was not passed by Congress). 
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States like China and the United States, however, have a lot to lose by 
disconnecting from the Internet. If China were to cut itself off from the 
Internet, this would negatively affect China’s export ability. China would 
likely face a withdrawal of Western investors as the Internet cutoff would 
result in a significant financial loss for Western investors.100 States, in 
recognizing the economic benefits of the international connectivity of the 
Internet, would be wise to develop disconnect plans only as a last resort in the 
face of a profound threat. 
The Chinese government also controls domestic access to content on the 
Internet by maintaining control over the mechanisms by which information 
travels through the Internet, through the Great Firewall of China. By filtering 
Internet traffic through eight gateways that connect the Chinese Internet to the 
global Internet and configuring Internet routers at those gateways to block 
certain website addresses and keywords, the Chinese government can prevent 
information from entering China that it deems threatening to its own regime.101 
As with pure public goods and true commons under international law, the 
principle of sovereignty is a significant political hurdle to securing the Internet 
for all across national boundaries. Similar to a public good, there is no 
effective market for government action that can solve the problem of Internet 
security; there is no process for global citizens to make collective decisions to 
secure the Internet.102 Contrary to what some, like John Perry Barlow, may 
have envisioned or wished for, during the early years of the Internet, 
cyberspace was not a place where no rules existed. Barlow and others 
discussed the Internet as a place where there was no sovereignty, a space that 
existed outside of government control where individual users on the Internet 
would form a “social contract” to solve problems and provide for any needs.103 
Under a system of sovereign states, the states have the power and legal 
authority to establish laws and institutions within their territories to provide for 
national public goods—such as Internet access—as well as to take action to 
ensure the safety and welfare of the nation and its citizens.104 If a state 
determines that harmful effects are impacting individuals or entities within the 
state because of information that flows from the Internet into that state, that 
 
 100 LIBICKI, supra note 73, at 100.  
 101 MACKINNON, supra note 97, at 35. 
 102 See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 86. 
 103 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FREEDOM FOUND. (Feb. 
8, 1996), http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html. 
 104 GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 86, at 156. 
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state could take action to prevent that flow of harmful information, including 
cutting off access to the Internet. “A government’s responsibility for redressing 
local harms caused by a foreign source does not change because the harms are 
caused by an Internet communication.”105 
China and Russia106 see internal dissent and anti-government writings 
disseminated on the Internet as one of the greatest online threats, and they 
maintain their authority to censor such information and limit access to the 
Internet.107 The United States, on the other hand, has argued against 
“overbroad state control” of the Internet, stating that Internet should not be “a 
system dominated by centralized government control.”108 Because of Chinese 
and Russian state sovereignty, however, the United States cannot force them to 
grant Internet users the right to voice their opinions. Contrary to what some 
argued about the nature of the Internet, the Internet exists in the real world 
where states continue to maintain sovereign control. 
The 2009–2010 controversy between the Chinese government and Google 
illustrates two significant facts about the current role of states and the “new 
digital superpowers” of the Internet—companies such as Google, Facebook, 
Microsoft, and Twitter. First, it illustrates how states will assert their sovereign 
right to control what takes place within their territory to include the cyber 
domain, and how states must balance that exercise of control with the goal of 
maintaining economic prosperity by continuing to reap the benefits of being 
connected to the Internet. Importantly, it also illustrates how the development 
of the norm of state responsibility will depend on cooperation between the 
government and private sector. 
In January 2010, Google announced that it would stop complying with 
censorship of searches by Google.cn and no longer do business within 
 
 105 Id. 
 106 China and Russia are not the only States that regulate content on the Internet in the name of protecting 
national security. See ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING 5 (Ronald 
Deibert et al. eds., 2008) The report found that twenty-six of the forty countries tested, including South Korea, 
China, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Iran and Yemen, filtered citizens’ Internet access in 2005 and 2006. Id. 
 107 E.g., Russia Passes Bill Modeling China’s ‘Great Firewall,’ GBTIMES (July 12, 2012), http://gbtimes. 
com/news/russia-passes-bill-modeling-chinas-great-firewall. 
 108 Michael H. Posner, Assistant Sec’y for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Remarks 
on Internet Freedom and Responsibility (Oct. 25, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/rm/2011/ 
176144.htm; see also Francis Tan, US in New Push To Break China’s Internet Censorship, NEXT WEB 
(May 11, 2011), http://thenextweb.com/asia/2011/05/11/us-in-new-push-to-break-chinas-internet-censorship. 
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China.109 This declaration came in response to attacks from Chinese computer 
servers, accessing the Gmail accounts of some human-rights activists, 
infiltrating some thirty-three companies’ networks, and likely stealing Google 
source code.110 Throughout the controversy, the Chinese government denied 
knowledge of the attacks while also maintaining its claim to the right to control 
the cyber domain within its sovereign territory, citing the supremacy of 
Chinese law within its cyber territory.111 
After the incident, Google announced that it would no longer cooperate 
with the Chinese government in its efforts to censor search results and would 
remove its censorship of certain items from its Chinese network.112 Prior to the 
cyber attacks, Google had been following China’s law with respect to required 
censorship.113 When Google announced it would stop abiding by the China 
censorship agreement, the Chinese government accused Google of evading 
Chinese law.114 From the perspective of the Chinese government, if Google 
refused to abide by the censorship orders from the Chinese government based 
on the domestic laws of the state, Google would not do business in China.115 
Ultimately, Google retained its license to do business in China and continued 
some activities not related to search (e.g., Android mobile phone operating 
system development and support, advertising sales, and research and 
development).116 Pressure within China from businesspeople who argued that a 
total ban on Google would be detrimental to Chinese industries that rely on 
Google’s products and services was instrumental to the Chinese government’s 
decision not to order a complete ban on all Google services.117 Google and the 
Chinese government came to a mutual agreement as to the terms of how 
Google would continue to do business within China.118 
 
 109 Tania Branigan, Google To End Censorship in China over Cyber Attacks, GUARDIAN (Jan. 12, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/jan/12/google-china-ends-censorship. 
 110 Timothy L. Thomas, Google Confronts China’s “Three Warfares,” PARAMETERS, Summer 2010, at 
101, 101. 
 111 For a discussion of China’s claim to sovereignty in cyberspace, see Sean Kanuck, Sovereign Discourse 
on Cyber Conflict Under International Law, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1571, 1585–87 (2010). 
 112 SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING (AND WHY WE SHOULD WORRY) 117–
18 (2011); see also Thomas, supra note 110, at 104. 
 113 Thomas, supra note 110, at 106. 
 114 Id. at 104. 
 115 MACKINNON, supra note 97, at 7–8. 
 116 Id. at 8. 
 117 Id. at 8–9. 
 118 David Barboza & Miguel Helft, A Compromise Allows Both China and Google To Claim a Victory, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2010, at B1. 
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Google was not the only corporation that faced disagreements with the 
Chinese government but ultimately submitted to China’s domestic laws. In 
1999, as Yahoo! entered the Chinese market, it announced that Yahoo! China 
would “give Internet users in China easy access to a range of Yahoo!’s popular 
services . . . .”119 However, the Chinese government demanded that Yahoo! 
filter materials the government deemed potentially harmful or threatening to 
the regime’s rule.120 In the summer of 2002, Yahoo! agreed to China’s 
demands and signed the Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for the Chinese 
Internet Industry and agreed to “inspect and monitor the information on 
[Chinese] domestic and foreign Web sites” and “refuse access to those Web 
sites that disseminate harmful information in order to protect the Internet users 
of China from the adverse influence of the harmful information.”121 
In defense of the company’s actions, and in response to critics who dubbed 
Yahoo! a “Chinese police auxiliary,”122 Jerry Yang, Yahoo! founder and 
former CEO, noted that, “[t]o be doing business in China, or anywhere else in 
the world, we have to comply with local law.”123 Similarly, Google 
acknowledged the challenge of doing business globally: “[Google] cannot run 
a business in China without being physically in China.”124 Companies that do 
business in other states will be subject to the sovereign authority of that state 
and its domestic laws. Cyberspace is no different than other domains where the 
sovereignty of the state persists. Companies, like Yahoo! and Google, face a 
difficult choice: abide by the states laws or forgo doing business within that 
state. Companies, just like states, must balance the advantages and 
disadvantages of these choices. 
While the Yahoo! and Google cases are largely commercial disputes 
between corporations and the state in which they conduct business, they also 
have clear political and international implications. Highlighting the political 
significance of the Google incident, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in 
a speech on January 21, 2010, spoke out about the Google incident, articulating 
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the U.S. commitment to freedom of communications in digital networks and 
calling on China to “conduct a thorough review of the cyber intrusions . . . .”125 
This embarrassed China and increased tensions between the two nations.126 
Chinese news outlets said Secretary Clinton’s singling out of China was 
inappropriate and misguided and constituted an inappropriate meddling in 
Chinese affairs.127 For Google, the implications were financial rather than 
political, and the dispute was resolved accordingly, with business decisions in 
mind.128 From the U.S. government’s perspective, however, there were larger 
political issues at stake that called for the establishment of new norms for the 
Internet to be adopted by states: norms of state responsibility in the cyber 
context.129 For Secretary Clinton, it was important to point out that China 
could be held responsible for attacks within its territory against U.S. 
companies. From the financial reputations of corporations to the economic and 
political security of states, a great deal is at stake in the cyber domain. 
As with other public goods in the international community, under 
international law, states cannot coerce other states to accept the costs of 
providing public goods without their consent. In the absence of any treaty 
agreement, the only international legal mechanism capable of coercing free-
riding states to accept solutions to ensure Internet access would be state 
unanimity at the U.N. Security Council. Within the U.N. system, members of 
the United Nations “confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security.”130 This authority of the 
Security Council extends into the cyber realm.131 If the Security Council were 
to determine that there has been a “breach of the peace,” an “act of 
aggression,” or a “threat to the peace,” it could authorize measures to restore 
international order.132 This would extend into cyberspace. Such actions 
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www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm). 
 126 VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 112, at 118. 
 127 See Paul McDougall, China Defends Great Firewall, INFORMATIONWEEK (Jan. 22, 2010), http:// 
www.informationweek.com/news/government/policy/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=222400246. 
 128 VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 112, at 117–21 (arguing that Google merely “chose the more profitable 
of the two evils”) (citing Does Google Violate Its ‘Don’t Be Evil’ Motto?, NPR (Nov. 26, 2008), http://www. 
npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=97216369). 
 129 Jason Healey, Beyond Attribution: Seeking National Responsibility for Cyber Attacks, ATLANTIC 
COUNCIL 5 (Jan. 2012), http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/403/022212_ACUS_NatlResponsibility 
Cyber.PDF.  
 130 U.N. Charter art. 24. 
 131 Nils Melzer, Cyberwarfare and International Law, UNIDIR 6 (2011), http://unidir.org/pdf/activites/ 
pdf2-act649.pdf.  
 132 U.N. Charter art. 39. 
LOTRIONTE GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/28/2013 1:28 PM 
2012] SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DEFENSE IN CYBER SPACE 851 
authorized or mandated by the U.N. Security Council under Chapter VII of the 
U.N. Charter would not constitute a violation of the target state’s sovereignty 
since the United Nations was acting under its granted authorities.133 Although 
the U.N. Security Council has the authority to mandate Internet security and 
Internet access if it deems it necessary to the maintenance of international 
peace and security, such a determination is not likely to occur. Unanimity 
among the permanent members of the Security Council, in light of the 
divergent views on Internet access and content control among states, is quite 
unlikely. 
Indeed, contemporary international law gives each state a right to be free, 
independent, and uninhibited from foreign control and forcible coercion. 
Sovereignty, a fundamental principle of international law since the Treaty of 
Westphalia of 1648,134 holds that each state retains exclusive authority over 
activities within its borders.135 The principle of state sovereignty over national 
territory is a basic tenet of international law, universally accepted as customary 
international law.136 This customary rule of territorial sovereignty is codified in 
modern international law.137 Any limitation on the authority a state has over its 
territory is subject to the consent of the state. Without the state’s consent, no 
other state may use force within the territorial state. Whether by land, sea, or 
air, no state may invade or use armed force within the sovereign territory of 
 
 133 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 18, (manuscript r. 1, para. 7) (“Security Council-mandated or 
authorized actions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (Rule 18), including those involving cyber 
operations, do not constitute a violation of the target State’s sovereignty.”). 
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another state.138 The scope of this authority over territory covers all national 
space, including cyberspace.139 
Although information contained in the cyber realm may be located in a 
“cloud” and the full stream of information flow may not travel through 
national territory per se, the physical aspects of cyberspace, such as computers, 
servers, phones, and fiber optic cables, are owned by a state or by private 
companies that operate in accordance with a state’s laws, and such assets are 
located within the borders of a governed state territory.140 The fact that a 
state’s physical cyber assets located in its territory are connected to the global 
Internet does not waive a state’s territorial sovereignty over those cyber assets 
and the activities involving them.141 The principle of sovereignty extends to the 
state’s authority over these assets, providing the state the right to restrict or 
protect access to the Internet.142 States maintain sovereignty over cyber assets 
within the state’s territory, and therefore these cyber assets are subject to the 
state’s legal and regulatory control and are protected by the state’s territorial 
sovereignty.143 As the state exercises such authority over its cyber assets, it 
also has certain obligations that follow from its sovereign authorities under 
international law. 
The principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity as rights of a state do 
not exist in a vacuum, but are balanced against the right of self-defense under 
international law.144 As the principle of sovereign equality conveys certain 
rights and exclusive authorities on a state, it also entails the obligation of all 
states to respect the territorial sovereignty of other states and prevent harm to 
them.145 In accordance with the U.N. General Assembly’s Declaration 
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Concerning Friendly Relations, states have a duty to refrain from organizing, 
encouraging, assisting, or tolerating incursions of armed bands or acts of civil 
strife in another state, and a duty to refrain from armed intervention for any 
reason in the internal or external affairs of another state.146 Under international 
law, states have an obligation to take appropriate steps to protect the interests 
of other states, including criminal acts or other activities that inflict serious 
damage to the victim state.147 
The idea is that when one state violates another state’s territorial integrity, 
it forfeits its own right to territorial integrity and state sovereignty. For 
example, if State A knows of a plan to conduct cyber attacks from its territory 
that will cause damage within State B’s territory and does not take reasonable 
steps to prevent this from occurring, then State A forfeits its rights of 
sovereignty within its territory as State B’s right of self-defense is activated. 
Within the legal context of rights, there exists a “balance between one State’s 
right to territorial integrity and another’s right to self-defense . . . .”148 How 
these rights are balanced between two states will depend on how a state 
invoking the right of territorial integrity has complied with international 
obligations with respect to the other state. The governance of the Internet and 
securing nations from cyber attacks, like providing for public goods and the 
protection of the commons under international law, bring this balance between 
sovereignty and a state’s duties under the law to the forefront of the debate. 
International law also requires that states “use due diligence to prevent the 
commission within its dominions of criminal acts against another nation or its 
people . . . .”149 It is well established, for example, that a state will be 
responsible for damage emanating from its territory, whether caused by 
noxious fumes, attacks by terrorists or mines exploding in waterways.150 These 
obligations stem from the basic principle of sovereignty, which entails both 
rights and obligations for states. Every state has the right to dictate what takes 
place within its territory; however, that right ends where another state’s 
 
 146 See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 136, at 121. 
 147 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, paras. 68–69 (May 
24); see also Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941). 
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territory begins. The right of sovereignty under international law declares 
intolerable any active intrusion into the internal affairs of a state. Article 2(4) 
of the U.N. Charter, by prohibiting one state from using or threatening to use 
force against another state, is a written and codified source of this 
obligation.151 
In the cyber domain, a host-state that has both the capability to prevent a 
cyber attack emanating from its territory, causing harm in another state, and 
fails to take action to prevent that harm has failed to fulfill its duty under 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. A cyber operation that constitutes a use of 
force under Article 2(4) is an internationally wrongful act.152 This proposition 
is reinforced when the host-state openly supports the cyber attack after the fact 
and fails to punish those individuals responsible. As the U.S. International 
Cyber Strategy states, in the cyber domain as in the physical domain, states 
need to recognize and act on their legal responsibility “to protect information 
infrastructures and secure national systems from damage or misuse.”153 
The events of 9/11 were perhaps the most pivotal point in history with 
regard to the evolution of the norm of state responsibility under international 
law. The international community, including the international legal 
community, was faced with the concrete reality that the world faced new 
threats, from non-state actors specifically, and that there was a need to rethink 
international legal mechanisms for dealing with these threats. The attacks 
against the United States on September 11, 2001, illustrate the ability of non-
state actors to carry out attacks against a state, causing significant death and 
destruction. Non-state actors in the cyber domain have also illustrated their 
ability to cause great harm to states.154 The vast majority of cyber attacks that 
have occurred to date have not been carried out by state-sponsored hackers, but 
by criminals intending to steal intellectual property and financial 
information.155 The level of connection between such criminals and a state is 
debatable. And although the cyber attacks that have occurred to date likely 
would not constitute an armed attack under the U.N. Charter framework, 
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unlike the 9/11 terrorist attacks, future cyber operations could cause the level 
of destruction necessary to constitute an armed attack. 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, there was a major departure from prior 
state practice in countering threats by non-state actors. Through a unanimous 
resolution, the U.N. Security Council authorized states to respond to the 
attacks carried out by al Qaeda with lethal force within the territory of another 
sovereign state.156 Whether a non-state actor could conduct an “armed attack” 
under international law has long been debated by international law scholars.157 
The U.N. Security Council, by invoking Article 51 of the U.N. Charter against 
those who carried out the 9/11 attacks, implied that attacks by non-state actors, 
in fact, could trigger the right of self-defense under the U.N. Charter.158 
Traditionally under international law, legal duties are imposed on a 
sovereign state only with its consent.159 Furthermore, the actions of private 
non-state actors are not attributable to the state.160 Liability for non-state 
actions would attach to the state only if the non-state actor is either a formal or 
de facto agent of the state.161 The ICJ has held in the context of military 
operations, that a state is responsible for the acts of non-state actors when it has 
“effective control” over such actors.162 However, there is disagreement over 
how much “control” is necessary to find a non-state actor’s actions attributable 
to a state. In Prosecutor v. Tadić, the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) adopted an “overall control” test,163 which is 
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 159 LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 27 (1995) (“State consent is the 
foundation of international law. The principle that law is binding on a state only by its consent remains an 
axiom of the political system, an implication of state autonomy.”). 
 160 See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., April 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, at 80, U.N. Doc 
A/56/10, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) (“Thus the general rule is that the only conduct 
attributed to the State at the international level is that of its organs of government, or of others who have acted 
under the direction, instigation or control of those organs, i.e. as agents of the State.”). 
 161 Id. 
 162 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 15 
(June 27). 
 163 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, para. 120 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
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considered a less stringent threshold.164 However, even with this lower 
standard, the ICTY found that the control would have to go “beyond “the mere 
financing and equipping of such forces and involv[e] also participation in the 
planning and supervision of military operations.”165 And yet, after 9/11, 
international law held Afghanistan accountable because it failed to uphold its 
duties to prevent al Qaeda from harming other states from its territory.166 
Furthermore, Afghanistan was held liable for terrorists attacks carried out by a 
non-state actor that no one argued was an agent of Afghanistan. 
Under international law, these responses to the 9/11 attacks considerably 
altered the application of jus ad bellum and, importantly, the norm of state 
responsibility. In the wake of those terrorist attacks, the United States argued 
that the attacks constituted an “armed attack” within the meaning of the self-
defense provision of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.167 As mentioned above, 
the issue of whether acts of non-state actors can constitute an armed attack 
absent direction by a state was controversial. Traditionally, Article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter and customary law of self-defense were characterized as 
applicable solely to armed attacks undertaken by one state against another.168 
Violent acts by non-state actors fell within a criminal law framework.169 
The United States further argued that it had the legal authority to act in self-
defense against Afghanistan because the Taliban, the ruling regime of 
Afghanistan, had supported and harbored leaders of the perpetrators of the 9/11 
attacks—al Qaeda.170 In other words, the Taliban had failed to take action to 
prevent al Qaeda from launching attacks against the United States from 
Afghanistan, despite U.S. pressure to do so.171 Through explicit warnings 
 
 164 See generally Antonio Cassese, The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment 
on Genocide in Bosnia, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 649 (2007) (comparing the “overall control” test to the “effective 
control” test and explaining why the less stringent overall control test is appropriate in certain circumstances 
where the more stringent effective control may not be appropriate). 
 165 Id. para. 145. 
 166 See S.C. Res. 1378,U.N. Doc. S/RES/1378 (2001) (Nov. 14, 2001). 
 167 Ashley S. Deeks, Pakistan’s Sovereignty and the Killing of Osama Bin Laden, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.: 
INSIGHTS (May 5, 2011), http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight110505.pdf. 
 168 Report on Extrajudicial Executions, supra note 158, paras. 40, 46. 
 169 Id. para. 46 (“Traditionally, States have refused to acknowledge the existence of an armed conflict 
with non-state groups. The reasons include not wanting to accord such groups recognition as ‘belligerents’ or 
‘warriors’, and instead being able to insist that they remain common criminals subject to domestic law.”). 
 170 Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the U.N., Letter dated Oct. 7, 2011 from the Permanent Representative 
of the United States to the United Nations addressed to President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001). 
 171 NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 350 (2004) 
(“The United States had warned the Taliban that they would be held accountable for further attacks by Bin 
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provided by the Unites States, the Taliban knew about the threat of harm that al 
Qaeda posed from within its territory, yet failed to meet its obligations under 
international law to prevent harm to others. Because there was no indication 
that the Taliban had directed al Qaeda in its operations against the United 
States, according to the reasoning of prior international court decisions, the 
Taliban did not “exercise[] effective—or even overall—control over al 
Qaeda.”172 Nevertheless, the United States concluded that because the Taliban 
had provided sanctuary to al Qaeda (refusing to expel its leader, bin Laden) 
even after being warned, the United States concluded that al Qaeda’s actions 
on 9/11 were imputable to the Taliban government.173 
In essence, the right of sovereignty that Afghanistan possessed under 
international law was balanced against the United States’ right of self-defense. 
Under the circumstances where Afghanistan failed to meet it international 
obligations, which resulted in harm to the United States, the United States’ 
right to use force in self-defense prevailed under international law. Following 
the 9/11 attacks, state responsibility for the actions of non-state actors can 
follow from the state’s failure to meet its international obligations to prevent 
its territory from being used as a platform or sanctuary for the non-state actors 
to attack other states.174 
Counterterrorism policy after 9/11 heralded in an important shift in the 
norm of state responsibility under international law. In authorizing the use of 
force against the al Qaeda in Afghanistan, the U.N. held Afghanistan 
responsible, in part, for al Qaeda’s attack against the United States. States are 
now held responsible for failing to prevent terrorists within their territory from 
causing harm elsewhere. As with counterterrorism policy, state practice in 
cybersecurity may reflect a similar adoption of the notion of a state’s 
obligations vis-à-vis non-state actors under international law. 
IV.  INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE USE OF FORCE 
This Part of the Article provides an overview of contemporary U.N. 
Charter law and customary international law governing the use of force by 
 
Ladin against Afghanistan’s U.S. interests. The warning had been given in 1998, again in late 1999, once more 
in the fall of 2000, and again in the summer of 2001.”). 
 172 David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 87, 96 (2010). 
 173 See Vincent-Joël Proulx, Babysitting Terrorists: Should States Be Strictly Liable for Failing To 
Prevent Transborder Attacks?, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 615, 637–41 (2005). 
 174 See TAL BECKER, TERRORISM AND THE STATE: RETHINKING THE RULES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 3 
(2006). 
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states in self-defense. In 1945, the United Nations was created “to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and “to suppress acts of 
aggression or other breaches of the peace.”175 Any analysis of the international 
laws related to the use of force begins with the prohibition on the use of force 
in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.176 States and commentators frequently use 
the word “war,” as is apparent in the language often used in discussing “cyber 
war,” but the drafters of the U.N. Charter purposely chose to use the broader 
term “use of force” in the prohibition in Article 2(4). States generally agree 
this prohibition is not only a treaty obligation but also customary international 
law.177 
Under international law there are a number of well-established exceptions 
to this general prohibition against the use of force: consent by a sovereign 
state;178 authority of the U.N. Security Council under Chapter VII, Articles 39, 
42 and 48;179 self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter;180 and 
anticipatory self-defense in accordance with the necessity and proportionality 
requirements of the Caroline precedent.181 In addition, most scholars recognize 
that there are uses of force that would fall below the threshold of Article 2(4), 
and therefore would not constitute a violation of Article 2(4).182 While such 
actions below the Article 2(4) threshold would not constitute uses of force, 
they may, however, constitute violations of other principles of international 
law such as sovereignty and the norm of non-intervention. 
The language of the U.N. Charter, as drafted in 1945, imposes certain 
challenges on the application of its provisions to contemporary cyber conflicts. 
First, there is the difficulty in determining the specific meaning of the words as 
used in the Charter given that the Charter does not define a “use of force” for 
 
 175 U.N. Charter pmbl.; see also Oscar Schachter, International Law: The Right of States to Use Armed 
Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1620 (1984) (“When the United Nations . . . Charter was adopted, it was 
generally considered to have outlawed war.”). For more information on the founding of the United Nations, 
see Joyner & Lotrionte, supra note 136, at 845. 
 176 U.N. Charter, art. 2 para. 4. 
 177 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 
190 (June 27).  
 178 U.N. Report, A More Secure World, supra note 1, at 58. 
 179 U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42, 48. 
 180 Id. art. 51. 
 181 See R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 89 (1938) (noting that the 
right of anticipatory self-defense is recognized in customary international law). 
 182 See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 80–81 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 5th ed. 
2011). 
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purposes of Article 2(4)183 or “armed attack” for purposes of Article 51.184 
Although one may imagine that the intent of the drafters of the Charter meant 
for the terms “use of force” and “armed attack” to reflect equivalent actions, 
international tribunals have treated these terms as different concepts.185 
Furthermore, the Charter lacks any express correlation between the terms used 
in Article 2(4) (“use of force”), Article 51 (“armed attack”), and Article 39 
(“act of aggression”) of the U.N. Charter, and the seemingly related term, 
“intervention,” noted in a number of General Assembly resolutions.186 The 
lack of clear definitions results in disagreement over the application of the law. 
For instance, the issue of whether “armed attack” is legally synonymous with 
“aggression” has never been settled.187 
Second, the U.N. Charter does not address the role of non-state actors in 
conflict. The Charter was developed as a response to the Second World War 
and was therefore focused on inter-state conflict, not the role of non-state 
actors in conflict.188 The issue of the scope of the applicability of Articles 2(4) 
and 51 to non-state actors was not addressed by the Charter. Nor does the 
Charter resolve the questions of a victim state’s right of self-defense against a 
non-state actor. In addition, at the time of the drafting of the Charter, there was 
no way for nations to consider the types of weapons that would be used in 
today’s conflicts. Cyber weapons like nuclear weapons were not even 
considerations in the minds of the drafters of the Charter. Today, states must 
 
 183 See U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4. 
 184 Id. art. 51. Article 51 reads:  
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures 
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to 
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary 
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
Id. 
 185 See JAMES A GREEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 111–28 (2009); TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER: EVOLUTIONS IN 
CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE 53–68 (2010). 
 186 E.g., Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex, arts. 1–3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 
(XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974); see also G.A. Res. 42/22, Annex, para. 1(7), U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/22 (Nov. 18, 
1987); Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 136, Annex, at 123. 
 187 As defined by the U.N. General Assembly, “Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.” Definition of Aggression, supra note 186, 
Annex, art. 1. 
 188 CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 7 (3d ed. 2008). 
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address the use of advanced cyber weapons in the context of conflicts, 
determining the legality of their use. Weapons such as trojan horses, viruses, 
worms and logic bombs have the potential to cause instantaneous and 
overwhelming damage to the functioning of a state while preserving the 
anonymity of the adversary. In contemporary times, where conflict will be 
conducted through cyberspace with cyber weapons, debates on law and policy 
related to issues of the role of non-state actors, attribution, responsibility, 
sovereignty, intervention, use of force and self-defense will dominate 
discussions. 
Imagine that a state is the targeted victim of a cyber attack from a private 
organization, a terrorist organization, or a privately owned security company, 
located within another state. Under this scenario, does the victim state have 
any recourse against the state from which the attack originated or against the 
private organization? Has the private organization committed an international 
wrongful act for which it can be held responsible? Can the state from which 
the private entity acts be held accountable for the private entity’s actions? Has 
the private entity violated Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter for which it can be 
held responsible? Some scholars have argued that Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter applies solely to members of the United Nations and “do[es] not apply 
to the acts of non-state actors, including individuals, organized groups, and 
terrorist organizations, unless they were attributable to a state pursuant to the 
law of state responsibility.”189 These scholars argue that if the act can be 
attributable to the state then the state is held to be in violation of the 
prohibition on the use of force and not the non-state actor.190 This 
interpretation of the U.N. Charter places the state as the sole entity of analysis. 
For purposes of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and the customary law of 
self-defense, traditional international law characterized these principles as only 
applicable to states that had undertaken armed attacks against another state.191 
Under this view, it is argued that the drafters of the Charter meant to cover 
only states when referring to Article 51.192 The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the 
specific response to those attacks, however, have raised questions about the 
legal doctrine of self-defense as it applies to non-state actors. The issue of 
 
 189 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 18 (manuscript r. 10, para. 5). 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. (manuscript r. 13, para. 16). 
 192 Antonio Cassese, The International Community’s ‘Legal’ Response to Terrorism, 38 INT’L & COMP. L. 
Q. 589, 597 (1989); Eric P.J. Myjer & Nigel D. White, The Twin Towers Attack: An Unlimited Right to Self-
Defence?, 7 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 5, 7 (2002).  
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whether Article 51 extends to attacks by non-state actors in the absence of any 
state complicity has been controversial in modern international law. 
Recently, scholars have disputed the position that only states can commit 
the kinds of actions that constitute an “armed attack” as envisioned in Article 
51 of the U.N. Charter. These scholars have argued that the U.N. Charter 
provisions were intended to cover non-state actors as well.193 Others who 
support this position argue that there has been an expansion of the law after 
9/11, permitting forcible self-defense against states harboring terrorists.194 
There has been much debate among academics about what it means for 
terrorist action to be attributable to a state.195 
Prior to 9/11, only a few states had invoked the principle of self-defense to 
justify the use of force in response to non-state terrorist attacks.196 In response 
to 9/11, however, state practice indicated a shift in states’ positions on this 
issue and a willingness by a number of states to apply the right of self-defense 
to attacks conducted by non-state actors.197 Following the 9/11 attacks, the 
Security Council, for the first time, implicitly affirmed the right of self-defense 
in response to terrorist attacks in Security Council Resolution 1368.198 Some 
have expressed doubt as to whether the resolutions passed by the Security 
 
 193 Rein Müllerson, Jus ad Bellum: Plus ça Change (Le Monde) Plus C’est L Même Chose (Le Droit)?, 7 
J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 149, 182 (2002). 
 194 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 
I.C.J.168, paras. 4–15 (separate opinion of Judge Simma) (arguing that the armed attacks carried out by 
irregular forces from States that do not have effective control over their territory still constitute armed attacks. 
They argued that 9/11 had brought about changes in the law); id. at 29–30 (separate opinion of Judge 
Kooijmans) (same); see also Steven R. Ratner, Ius ad Bellum and Ius in Bello After September 11, 96 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 905, 906 (2002). 
 195 E.g., STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
182 (1996); ANTHONY CLARKE AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: 
BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 158 (1993) (describing four levels of State sponsorship of terrorist 
actors: none, toleration, support, sponsorship). 
 196 See ALEXANDROV, supra note 195, at 182; AREND & BECK, supra note 195, at 142, 158. Prior to 9/11, 
Israel and the United States had invoked Article 51 to justify the use of force in response to terrorist attacks 
abroad: by Israel against Tunis in 1985, AREND & BECK, supra note 195, at 152; by the United States against 
Libya in 1986, ALEXANDROV, supra note 195, at 184; by the United States against Iraq in 1993 in response to 
an attempted assassination against former President Bush by Iraqi agents; Id. at 186; and by the United States 
against Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998, RUYS, supra note 185, at 202. 
 197 After the 9/11 attacks by al Qaeda, the U.N. Security Council adopted a number of resolutions 
recognizing the applicability of the right of self-defense. See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 156; S.C. Res. 1373, 
supra note 68. One could argue that by “recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence 
in accordance with the Charter” when condemning the terrorist attacks on 9/11 in Resolution 1368 and 
invoking the specific language of Article 51 in doing so, the U.N. Security Council affirmed the right of self-
defense against non-State actors when there has been an “armed attack.” See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 156. 
 198 S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 156. 
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Council after 9/11 actually support a legal right of self-defense against 
terrorists because the language expressly used in the resolutions is “threat to 
international peace and security” rather than “armed attack” under Article 
51.199 Furthermore, they argue that because the language invoking the right of 
“self-defense” was mentioned only in the preamble of the resolutions and not 
in the legally controlling resolution articles, the Council was not affirming the 
existence of any such right.200 
It would seem that these arguments are too rigid. First, Security Council 
resolutions have significance in the development of the law if they deal with 
state behavior and implicitly or explicitly accept or reject state claims of self-
defense. Although Article 51 indicates a central role for the Security Council, 
it does not require it to rule on the legality of any claim of self-defense, and in 
practice, it has rarely made explicit reference to Article 51 in its resolutions.201 
When the Security Council has invoked Article 51, it has typically done so in 
only general terms.202 Moreover, related to the U.S. claim of self-defense after 
9/11, it would seem the Security Council and the international community was 
willing to accept the use of force in self-defense against the terrorists. Soon 
after the Security Council resolutions, NATO invoked Article 5,203 the OAS 
invoked collective self-defense,204 Russia, China, and Japan provided military 
 
 199 Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law, 
12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 993 (2001). 
 200 Id. 
 201 See S.C. Res. 546, para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/546 (Jan. 6, 1984) (Security Council affirming Angola’s 
right to take measures in accordance with Article 51 when it was attacked by South Africa); S.C. Res. 574, 
para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/574 (Oct. 7, 1985) (same); S.C. Res. 661, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 
1990) (affirming Kuwait’s right to individual and collective self-defense after the Iraqi invasion). 
 202 S.C. Res. 1234, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1234 (Apr. 9, 1999) (recalling the inherent right of individual 
and collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 as it related to the conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo). 
 203 Press Release, NATO, Statement by the North Atlantic Council, NATO Press Release (2001) 124 
(Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm. Article 5 of the North 
American Treaty provides:  
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America 
shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed 
attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence 
recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so 
attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it 
deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the 
North Atlantic area. 
North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. 
 204 Terrorist Threat to the Americas, C.M.F.A. Res. 24/01, OAS Consultation of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, 24th Meeting, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.F/II.24/RC.24/RES.1/01 (Sept. 21, 2001). 
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support,205 and the United States and United Kingdom wrote to the U.N. 
Security Council under Article 51, stating that they were acting in individual 
and collective self-defense.206 And lastly, to argue the lack of a right to self-
defense based upon the decision-making processes of the Security Council 
ignores strong arguments for a customary right of self-defense, pre-dating the 
U.N. Charter207 and underestimates the importance of vast state practice on the 
issue. The core essence of a right of self-defense is universally accepted.208 
The question remains as to whether the events following 9/11 brought 
about a radical transformation of the law of self-defense against non-state 
actors or whether their significance ought to be narrowly understood. The latter 
idea is premised on the belief that the actions against al Qaeda after 9/11 were 
in reaction to a specific incident of terrorist attacks within the territory of a 
state, leading to a particular response based on Security Council authorization 
and broad international acceptance by other states. It is currently debated 
whether any incident in the cyber domain would (no matter how devastating) 
elicit a response equivalent to the U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks. As with 
other areas of international law, state practice will likely dictate how the law 
will develop in this area. 
In arguing that non-state actors are indeed covered by Article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter, one perspective, embraced by the ICJ, is that non-state actors 
may commit “armed attacks” for purposes of Article 51, triggering the right of 
self-defense, but only in cases when those attacks are attributable to a state.209 
For instance, when the state is complicit in the non-state actor’s actions. 
Another approach also in support of the view that non-state actors are covered 
 
 205 Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 96 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 237, 248 (2002). 
 206 See Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the U.N., supra note 170; Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent 
Mission of the U.K. to the U.N., Letter dated Oct. 7, 2001 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent 
Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/947 (Oct. 7, 2001). 
 207 See generally D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL 
& FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961); STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, 
Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defense in Modern International Law, reprinted in JUSTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS 530 (1994). 
 208 Oscar Schacter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 259, 259 (1989). 
 209 See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, para. 139 (July 9) (rejecting Israel’s argument based on self-defense 
because Israel had not claimed that the terrorist attacks were imputable to a state); Allen S. Weiner, The Use of 
Force and Contemporary Security Threats: Old Medicine for New Ills?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 415, 435–36 (2006) 
(mentioning that the international community has been critical of uses of force against non-State terrorists in 
the territory of another State when the State is not supporting them). 
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by Article 51, and one taken up by this Article, accepts that an attack by a non-
state actor may constitute an “armed attack” regardless of whether a state is 
directly involved in any aspect of the attack.210 In support of this position, is 
the plain language of Article 51, which does not limit the right of self-defense 
as applicable only to states. Unlike Article 2(4), which specifically refers to a 
use of force by one “Member” against “any state,” Article 51 makes no 
mention of any requirement of an armed attack being committed by a state.211 
This perspective is also supported by recent state practice in response to 
terrorist attacks.212 
In applying this perspective to contemporary cyber operations, this Article 
argues that devastating cyber operations conducted by a non-state actor against 
a state which result in the requisite level of harm, equivalent to the scale and 
effects of an armed attack in the kinetic context, can constitute an armed attack 
against the state for purposes of Article 51.213 Moreover, the state would have 
the right of self-defense against the non-state actor within the territory of the 
other state. The thornier question, however, is what standard decision-makers 
should use in deliberating about what factual circumstances would allow for 
such actions under the law. The Part V of this Article will offer such a 
standard. 
The approach one supports with respect to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 
the right of self-defense, and its applicability to non-state actors will ultimately 
dictate what one accepts as a legal use of force in response to an “attack” by a 
 
 210 See JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 296 
(2010) (“[I]nternational practice seems to have evolved both to allow self-defence against armed attacks by 
non-state forces, and to loosen the required link between such forces and a state in which armed defence 
measures are taken.”); DINSTEIN, supra note 182, at 224–30; Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right of 
Self-Defense, 95 AM. J. INT’L. L. 839, 840 (2001); Raphaël Van Steenberghe, Self-Defence in Response to 
Attacks by Non-State Actors in the Light of Recent State Practice: A Step Forward?, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 
183, 184 (2010) (concluding that recent State practice suggests that attacks committed by non-State actors 
constitute armed attack sunder Article 51).  
 211 Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 41, 50 (2002). 
 212 See id. at 49–50; see also Franck, supra note 210, at 840 (“It is inconceivable that actions the Security 
Council deems itself competent to take against a nonstate actor under Articles 41 and 42 in accordance with 
Article 39 should be impermissible when taken against the same actor under Article 51 in exercise of a state’s 
‘inherent’ right of self-defense.”). 
 213 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 18 (manuscript r. 13, para. 16). But see id. (“A minority of the Group 
[of Experts] did not accept this premise.”). The Group of Experts was split over whether individuals, not party 
to an organization, could conduct armed attacks. Some argued that if the effects of the actions met the scale 
and effect test then actions of individuals could rise to the level of armed attacks. Others maintained that cyber 
attacks conducted by individuals were solely matters of criminal law enforcement. Id. (manuscript r. 13, para. 
19). 
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non-state actor. Each view will lead to a different test assessing the legality of 
the use of force. Although the ICJ does not support the third view as described 
above,214 this Article argues that this approach is the most appropriate in the 
context of cyber operations, based on interpretation of the law, past state 
practice against terrorists and the likely accepted practice by states in cyber 
conflict. In cyberspace, where disruptive effects against critical infrastructure 
can be destructive to a state and non-state actors have the capability to carry 
out damaging cyber operations against states within seconds, if not 
milliseconds, states will want to react to attacks quickly and effectively.215 
The remainder of this Article will review the body of international law 
related to the use of force, examining the relevant factors that treaty law, 
international courts, and legal scholars have looked to in discussing the legality 
of the use of force in self-defense. The Part IV of this Article will provide a list 
of factors as part of a standard that could be used as policymakers contemplate 
the use of force against a non-state actor conducting cyber attacks from another 
state’s territory in the cyber realm. When a state is addressing the issue of 
groups conducting cyber attacks against it from within another state, a standard 
by which to assess the legal bounds for a response in self-defense would be 
useful. 
A. The International Court of Justice: Use of Force Decisions 
In 1945, the U.N. Charter established the ICJ as the “principal judicial 
organ of the United Nations.”216 The Court was to resolve disputes brought 
before it by states, including disputes related to armed conflict.217 The U.N. 
Security Council, through its authorities embodied in the U.N. Charter, also 
was meant to play a role in resolving disputes as it carried out its function of 
“maintaining international peace and security.” For instance, the U.N. Security 
Council may, under Chapter VII of the Charter, authorize a state or group of 
states to use force when it finds that there is a threat or breach of the peace.218 
Since the creation of the United Nations, the Security Council has only rarely 
authorized such use of force. Under circumstances when the Security Council 
 
 214 See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 215 See Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force 
Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 229–31 (2002) (noting that states should be able 
to defend against computer network attacks—up to the limits of proportionality—whether or not classified as 
uses of force, and reviewing both active and passive defense options). 
 216 U.N. Charter art. 92. 
 217 See BEDERMAN, supra note 67, at 233–34. 
 218 U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41. 
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fails to take such action, the issue of whether a use of force was lawful is 
brought before the ICJ. It is important to understand the court’s analysis in 
these cases in order to apply its reasoning to other incidents that will likely 
occur in the cyber domain. 
Since the Court’s first rulings related to the use of force, the court has 
addressed fundamental questions about the application of the following 
principles: 
To what extent may a state use force in response to acts of violence by 
another state that fall short of full-scale military campaigns? 
To what extent may a state use force in response to non-state actors? 
Under what circumstances is a state responsible under international law 
for supporting or tolerating the presence of non-state groups that use force 
against another state? 
To what extent can force be used against a state that provides such 
support or tolerance to non-state actors? 
To what extent must a resort to force in self-defense be limited in terms 
of its intensity or scope? 
The decisions by the court in these cases address important issues about the 
resort to force in the absence of Security Council authorization. While these 
decisions are not without criticism, they provide a reference for the analysis of 
the international rules that will be the most conducive to the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts in the cyber domain. These decisions are also useful is 
assessing the ability of international law and international courts to maintain 
order in the cyber domain while giving due regard to the legitimate needs of 
states to protect their basic security interests. 
The first dispute to be brought before the court, the Corfu Channel case, 
involved a dispute over the duty of a state to not allow it’s territory to be used 
to harm another state.219 The case arose out of an incident in October 1946 in 
which two British destroyers struck mines while passing through Albanian 
waters in a strait used for passage between areas of the high seas.220 Albania 
denied any responsibility for the laying of the mines.221 After considering the 
 
 219 BEDERMAN, supra note 67, at 43. 
 220 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 12–15 (Apr. 1949). 
 221 Id. at 11. 
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facts presented by the parties, the court concluded that the mine laying could 
not have occurred without the knowledge of the Albanian government.222 In 
other words, the Albanian government must have known that the mines had 
been laid in the channel and was therefore, the court concluded, responsible for 
its failure to warn the British navy of the presence of the mines and the 
potential damage to ships.223 Having known of the threat and failing to alert the 
British ships to the potential danger from the mines, Albania was found legally 
responsible for any damages.224 
The court’s opinion is limited in that it did not find that Albania committed 
an act of aggression. Nor did the court discuss the use of force specifically. It is 
significant, however, that the court upheld the principle of holding states 
responsible for acts within its territory that it ought to have known about and 
that ultimately harmed another state.225 The court stated that all states have a 
duty “not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the 
rights of other States.”226 From the court’s ruling, states can be held 
responsible for acts of omission that lead to harm irrespective of whether the 
state’s actions rise to the level of a use of force. 
The court’s decision has been generally well-received.227 Importantly, it 
has furthered the development of the law with respect to state responsibility 
and has been viewed by many as appropriate in holding Albania responsible 
for its illegal use of force in mining the international strait.228 However, the 
part of the court’s ruling against Great Britain, finding that Great Britain had 
violated the sovereignty of Albania by passing through the territorial waters of 
Albania, in violation of innocent passage, as it swept for mines without 
 
 222 Id. at 22. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. at 23. 
 225 See id at 22–23. 
 226 Id. at 22. 
 227 See, e.g., Quincy Wright, Editorial Comment, The Corfu Channel Case, 43 AM. J. INT’L L. 491, 515–
16 (1949) (“The Court manifested the tendency, displayed by Chief Justice Marshall in dealing with the 
American Constitution and by the Permanent Court of International Justice in dealing with the League of 
Nations Covenant, to construe the rights and powers of the Organization with which the Court was connected 
broadly enough to permit that Organization to function and to achieve its purposes. International lawyers who 
recognize that . . . will welcome this tendency of the Court. In a world, shrinking but inadequately 
regulated, . . . it is probably safer to treat the claims of the international society liberally, even if such 
treatment . . . involves some danger of stimulating revolt by the states least aware of the situation.”). 
 228 John Norton Moore, Jus Ad Bellum Before the International Court of Justice, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 903, 
918 (2012). 
LOTRIONTE GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/28/2013 1:28 PM 
868 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
Albania’s consent, has been criticized.229 The court, holding Albania 
responsible for damages, found that Great Britain was also responsible for 
violating international law.230 Importantly, this aspect of the court’s decision 
also provides insight into how the court may assess a state’s right of self-
defense against non-state actors. 
By finding that Great Britain violated Albanian sovereignty,231 some 
writers argued, the court undermined the law against illegal mining by 
removing the defensive right of Great Britain.232 In the cyber context, the 
implication from the court’s ruling is that if a state illegally is conducting cyber 
operations from its territory in violation of the victim state’s sovereignty, the 
options for other states are to accept the status quo and suffer the consequence 
of the cyber operations or to respond by using “active defense”233 measures 
within the territory of the target state and be condemned equally with the 
aggressive cyber state. 
In 1984, the ICJ was asked for the first time in Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua to resolve a dispute related to a major 
armed conflict that was currently ongoing.234 Nicaragua initiated the action in 
the court alleging that the United States had violated the U.N. Charter, other 
treaties, and customary international law related to non-intervention and the 
use of force by carrying out covert operations against Nicaragua, including the 
mining of Nicaragua waters and training, arming, supplying, and financing the 
contra rebels who were fighting against the Nicaraguan government.235 In June 
1986, the court ruled in Nicaragua’s favor and held that the United States had 
violated international law.236 For the first time, the court outlined a distinction 
between a “use of force” and an “armed attack” as identified in Article 2(4) 
and 51 respectively in the U.N. Charter.237 
 
 229 Id. at 905, 918 (arguing that the ICJ’s jus ad bellum decisions have “adopted a minimalist approach 
undermining the Charter and encouraging aggression, particularly aggression in the ‘secret warfare’ 
spectrum”). 
 230 Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 36. 
 231 Id. at 34. 
 232 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 228, at 918. 
 233 See infra note 362 and accompanying text. 
 234 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 32 
(June 27). 
 235 Id. para 15. 
 236 Id. para 290. 
 237 Id. para 210. 
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In the Nicaragua decision, the court limited a state’s right of self-defense 
by finding against the United States. The Court rejected the United States’ 
argument that it had acted in collective self-defense on behalf of El Salvador in 
response to Nicaragua’s attacks.238 The United States argued that the 
Nicaraguan regime’s support of the rebels fighting against the government in 
El Salvador amounted to an “armed attack” against El Salvador.239 The court, 
however, found that Nicaragua’s actions in support of the rebels did not rise to 
the level of an “armed attack” under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and, 
therefore, the United States had no right of collective self-defense.240 
The court used the definition of aggression provided in the General 
Assembly’s Definition of Aggression to arrive at its conclusion that “the 
sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another state of such 
gravity as to amount to (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular 
forces, or its substantial involvement therein” could be an “armed attack.”241 In 
analyzing the actions of Nicaragua and the United States, the court drew a 
distinction between “the most grave forms of the use of force (those 
constituting an armed attack)” and “other less grave forms.”242 The latter were 
still unlawful and could result in declaratory relief or reparations, but only the 
former entitled the victim to take forcible action in self-defense. 
Later on in the Oil Platforms case, the court would again invoke the 
distinction it drew in the Nicaragua case between a use of force and an armed 
attack.243 The United States has criticized the court’s position on this point. 
Critics have argued that: 
[The] requirement that an attack reach a certain level of gravity 
before triggering a right of self-defense would make the use of force 
more rather than less likely, because it would encourage states to 
 
 238 Id. para. 238. 
 239 Id. para. 48, 128. 
 240 Id. para. 230, 235. The Court also found that the collective self-defense principle requires the victim 
State to provide notice of the attack and publicly ask for assistance in self-defense. The Court failed to find 
evidence of El Salvador providing such notice or public request for help and ruled against the U.S. claim under 
collective self-defense. Id. para. 199, 236. 
 241 Id. para. 195 (quoting Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 3(g), Annex, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 242 Id. para 191.  
 243 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 324, para. 51 (Nov. 6). 
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engage in a series of small-scale military attacks, in the hope that 
they could do so without being subjected to defensive responses.244 
The reverse concern is that, if we conflate the two levels the Nicaragua court 
set up, an armed attack will be as serious as a use of force. The danger in this 
scenario is that, with no gravity requirement for an armed attack and self-
defense, an inter-state conflict could arise out of minor cross-border incidents 
or other minor uses of force. In a September 2012 speech, Harold Koh, the 
then-Legal Advisor at the State Department, stated that in cyber space the 
United States’ view is that, “there is no threshold for a use of deadly force to 
qualify as an ‘armed attack’ that may warrant a forcible response.”245 He noted 
that some nations do not agree with this position and consider an “armed 
attack” as having a higher threshold before the right of self-defense is 
triggered.246 In cyberspace, where escalation may occur more quickly with less 
opportunity for deliberation and deterrence to work, the issue of what 
thresholds states believe exist related to the use of force, armed attack, and 
self-defense becomes a very critical issue.247 
In Nicaragua, the court concluded that the actions of Nicaragua and United 
States did not rise to the level of an armed attack and therefore did not trigger 
either state’s right to use force in self-defense. The court’s limited definition of 
“armed attack” has drawn much criticism, mainly by U.S. writers.248 Judge 
Schwebel from the United States and Judge Jennings from the United 
Kingdom, in their dissenting opinions of the court decision, strongly criticized 
the court’s narrow definition of “armed attack.” Judge Schwebel was 
concerned that the court’s decision would encourage predator states to take 
advantage of weaker states, aggressively acting against them while the victim 
state would be restricted from legally acting in defense.249 Other critics of the 
court’s opinion have argued that defining armed attack so narrowly precludes a 
lawful defensive action in the context of a “secret war” because “assistance to 
rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support” 
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are components of most secret wars.250 In the cyber context, this aspect of the 
court’s holding is likely to remove the right of defense against secret warfare, 
“indirect aggression,” and “war by proxy” in cyberspace. This potentially 
creates an unstable environment in cyberspace where states are encouraged to 
use cyber methods covertly in a domain where most actions are already 
conducted in secret. This situation could likely undermine the Charter structure 
itself. 
According to the court, sending armed bands into the territory of another 
state by itself does not amount to an “armed attack” unless the scale and effects 
of doing so would be equivalent to “an armed attack rather than as a mere 
frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces.”251 In 
applying the reasoning of the court to the 2010 Stuxnet worm that targeted 
uranium enrichment infrastructure in Iran,252 the cyber operation would not rise 
to the level of an armed attack because the malware did not cause any 
permanent physical destruction equivalent to that level of destruction that 
“regular armed forces” would have caused nor did it result in any loss of life. 
In the Stuxnet case, about one thousand centrifuges had to be replaced but 
there was not any permanent physical damage to the overall facility and there 
was no loss of life.253 Temporarily stopping the functioning of the uranium 
enrichment facility by causing the malfunction of some centrifuges without 
any serious damage to the facility or loss of life would not be an “armed 
attack” under the standard outlined by the court in the Nicaragua case.254 
Furthermore, under the Nicaragua ruling, Iran would not have any forcible 
right of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 
In some important ways, the decision of the court illustrates a very limited 
understanding of the requirements of effective war against covert attack and 
secret wars. This could be particularly troubling in cyberspace where 
 
 250 Moore, supra note 228, at 928 (quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 
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 253 See David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 
2012, at A1. 
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the “considerably high” threshold of Article 51, a State may take “strictly defensive military action” against 
lower-level attacks. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 324, paras. 12–13 (Nov. 6) (separate 
opinion of Simma, J.). In the case of Stuxnet, according to Judge Simma’s reasoning, as long as the defensive 
response was strictly defensive, Iran may legally respond to Stuxnet even if Stuxnet is not considered an armed 
attack. 
LOTRIONTE GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/28/2013 1:28 PM 
872 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
attribution of the adversary may be difficult and proxies more easily used by 
states. In finding that the U.S. action was not necessary in defending El 
Salvador, the court implies that the United States and El Salvador could have 
defended El Salvador without violating the sovereign territory of Nicaragua by 
limiting action to the elimination of the traffic of arms and ammunition inside 
El Salvador’s territory.255 Particularly in cyber, where it is easy for adversaries 
to carry out devastating attacks in secret through the use of proxies, a judicial 
ruling that geographically limits the victim state’s right of defense to its own 
territory will make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a state to defeat 
cyber aggressors. Restricting a state that is under a cyber attack to focus only 
on incoming traffic once it has crossed the “gateways” at the state’s borders 
provides the aggressor the advantage while leaving the victim state a sitting 
duck. If a state waits until the adversary has infiltrated its networks with cyber 
weapons before taking action, it is too late. 
B. Support or Tolerance of Non-State Actors 
1. State Responsibility Generally 
Under customary international law of state responsibility, states bear 
responsibility for any act that is attributable to the state that is a breach of an 
international legal obligation applicable to that state.256 As the Corfu Channel 
case held, such breaches can be both affirmative acts by the state and acts of 
omission.257 In the cyber context, an internationally wrongful act that a state 
would be responsible for could be a violation of the U.N. Charter, a state’s use 
of force through a cyber operations, a violation of a law of armed conflict 
obligation such as a cyber attack against civilians or the breach of peacetime 
rules such as conducting cyber operations in the territory of another state 
without that state’s consent. The victim state must be able to show that damage 
has occurred (or will occur) from the wrongful act.258 This obligation by the 
state is not limited to preventing acts that would be criminally harmful to 
another state, but also extends to acts that would (or have the potential to) 
inflict serious damage within the victim state.259 
 
 255 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1985 I.C.J. 14, para. 154. 
 256 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 1–2, U.N. Doc. 
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In addition to being internationally wrongful, the act must be attributable to 
a state. This attribution requirement of the norm is the element that is most 
challenging in the cyber context. Attribution for cyber operations is 
particularly difficult when attackers can hide their identity as well as the point 
of origin of the attack, using neutral states from which to launch the attacks. 
According to the customary international law of state responsibility, any 
actions by a state official would be attributable to the state if the individual in 
question were acting in his or her official capacity.260 This would include 
actions that may not have been officially authorized as well as actions 
conducted by private parties retained by the state.261 These entities are treated 
as extensions of the state. 
What happens, however, when non-state actors who operate separately 
from the state conduct a wrongful act in breach of international law? Can such 
actions be attributable to the state such that the state would incur international 
legal responsibility for those actions? Under some circumstances, the conduct 
of non-state actors may be attributable to a state and will give rise to that 
state’s international legal responsibility. According to Article 8 of the Articles 
of State Responsibility, restating customary international law, such actions can 
be attributable to a state for legal responsibility purposes if the state has 
instructed the non-state actors to take specific action or provided direction or 
control over them “in carrying out the conduct.”262 Under Article 8, merely 
encouraging or expressing support for the acts of non-state actors will not 
constitute “control.” The specific level of control by the state over the non-
state actors to attribute those acts to the state, however, is debatable. 
Furthermore, the question of the level of control by the state over these acts 
that would be necessary to attribute those actions to the state to allow the use 
of force against the territory of the host state in self-defense is a hotly 
contested issue. The courts have provided some guidance, but it is not 
necessarily consistent or clear.263 
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In the Nicaragua case, while the court had concluded U.S. arming of the 
contras was not an armed attack for purposes of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 
it did find that the U.S. action violated its legal obligation not to “intervene in 
matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a State.”264 In other words, the 
United States had committed an internationally wrongful act in violation of a 
legal obligation and was therefore responsible for the harm done. The court 
explained that the principle of non-intervention prohibits acts of intervention 
against a state’s free choice of a “political, economic, social and cultural 
system, and the formulation of foreign policy.”265 
The court noted that cases of intervention using force would be wrongful 
whether it is a “direct form of military action or in the indirect form of support 
for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another State.”266 The court 
made it clear that it is unlawful for one state to provide assistance for armed 
action by non-state groups against another state.267 In finding that the United 
States had substantially supported the military operations of the contras, the 
court decided that the United States had acted “in breach of its obligations 
under customary international law not to use force against another State, not to 
intervene in its affairs.”268 
In the Congo case, the court provided additional analysis on the issue of the 
level of control by a state over the non-state actors’ actions required to hold the 
state responsible for the actions of non-state actors. In this case, the court 
concluded that Uganda had given training and military support to an armed 
group operating against the Congolese government and held that this support 
constituted violations of the principles of non-use of force and non-
intervention, even though the court did not find that Uganda controlled the 
operations of that group.269 The court also found that the Congo was not in a 
position to end the groups’ activities, and therefore the court said it could not 
conclude that the Congo had “tolerat[ed]” or “acquiesce[d]” in the groups’ 
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activities.270 The court therefore did not uphold Uganda’s claim against the 
Congo for tolerating the groups.271 
Based on these decisions by the court, a state that provides military support 
or guidance to an armed group may be found guilty of committing “unlawful 
intervention” and possibly “unlawful use of force” even if it was not involved 
with planning and directing the operations of the group.272 Furthermore, a state 
will be held responsible if it can prevent such groups from acting within its 
territory and fails to do so, but not if it is unable to do so.273 This principle may 
be more difficult to apply in the context of cyber operations, however, where it 
may be difficult to determine whether the failure to stop such activities is the 
result of a state’s unwillingness to deal with the problem, because it supports 
the cyber operations, or its inability to stop the operations, for example, 
because the state cannot convince the private sector entities such as the Internet 
Service Providers (“ISPs”) to stop the malicious traffic causing the damage to 
the target. In sum, however, the principle reinforces the right of an attacked 
state to use force to protect itself from such attacks if it has no other remedy. 
How this may play out in the cyber domain, however, is debatable with little 
state practice to analyze to date. 
The international courts have not had the occasion to rule on the application 
of existing law to cyber conflict. And it is likely that we will not see such 
decisions in the near future. While some may point to the accomplishments of 
the courts in other areas of the law of armed conflict, unfortunately, on some of 
the key questions related to use of force and state responsibility, the courts 
have provided mixed, and at times, confusing guidance. Certainly, one can 
conclude from the courts’ opinions that they are not oriented to practical 
considerations that states must deal with and are therefore of more limited 
utility in the real world of armed conflict. Especially in the context of cyber, 
where clear, immediate evidence may be impossible to produce, states may be 
left to their own recourse in defending against cyber attacks from state and 
non-state actors. Ultimately, the decisions of the international courts will not 
take the place of international agreements or state practice as the primary 
sources of the law related to the use of force. However, these decisions still 
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provide important understanding of the consensus of at least some parts of the 
international community as to how these rules will apply. 
2. Self-Defense: When Non-State Actors are Conducting Armed Attacks 
In the cyber context where aggression from non-state actors can be of 
enormous consequence, as discussed in the previous Subpart, the ability of a 
state to hold non-state actors accountable and exercise its right of self-defense 
against the aggressor within the territory of another state will at times be 
deemed necessary. Yet the ability of a state to attribute responsibility of non-
state actors to the state and then to use force in self-defense against the state 
has been controversial under international law. 
Beyond the general legal responsibility that may be imposed upon a state 
for the actions of non-state actors, there remains the additional question of 
whether a state’s support to non-state actors entitles the victim state to use 
force in self-defense. If so, can the state use force against the state itself or 
solely the non-state actors? The notion that actions by irregular forces can 
constitute armed attack is not contested by states. The issue of cross-border 
action by irregular forces has given rise to much difficulty in interpreting the 
law related to the use of force. If these forces are acting on behalf of the state 
from whose territory they are operating and their actions are of such gravity as 
to amount to an armed attack, the legal situation is clear.274 However, the 
question of what degree of state involvement is necessary to allow the use of 
force against the territory of the host state in self-defense has proven to be a 
very complicated one under the law. Moreover, states have shown that they 
will act in self-defense against non-state actors conducting attacks against the 
state.275 The controversy, however, is centered around the issue of how much 
state involvement in the non-state actor’s actions is necessary to make those 
actions attributable to the state, justifying action in self-defense within the 
other state. 
Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, this question has been the focus of much 
discussion. Most recently, for example, in May 2011, the United States, 
without the consent of Pakistan, sent U.S. forces into Pakistan to capture or kill 
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Osama bin Laden.276 Following the operation, the Pakistani government 
objected to the U.S. action, arguing that it was an “unauthorized unilateral 
action.”277 President Obama had previously stated that, “if we have actionable 
intelligence against bin Laden or other key al-Qaeda officials . . . and Pakistan 
is unwilling or unable to strike against them, we should.”278 And in May 2010, 
the United States did.279 
While commentators and academics have debated whether the U.S. 
operation in this case was lawful under international law, the United States has 
continued the use of the armed drones against individual terrorists in other 
states such as Yemen, Syria, and Pakistan. This indicates that the U.S. will 
continue to use force in self-defense against non-state actors even if they may 
reside in states against which the United States is not in armed conflict.280 
Codified international law, however, does not provide those states that are the 
victims of ongoing attacks by non-state actors sufficient guidance about the 
factual and legal standard to apply when determining whether to use force in 
self-defense under circumstances where a non-state actor is conducting armed 
attacks and may be receiving support from another state. 
In the Nicaragua case, the court not only ruled on the illegal use of force by 
the United States but it also addressed the U.S. argument that its use of force 
was justified as collective self-defense of Costa Rica, Honduras, and El 
Salvador in response to armed attacks on those states by Nicaragua. The court 
rejected this argument finding that there was no armed attack by Nicaragua. 
According to the Nicaragua case, the assistance to rebels in the form of 
provisions of weapons or logistical or other support did not amount to an 
armed attack and therefore would not justify the use of force in self-defense by 
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the victim state.281 However, the court also ruled that while this type of 
assistance to the rebels would not amount to an armed attack, it could be illegal 
intervention or an illegal use of force.282 In establishing a high threshold for 
what may constitute an armed attack, in contrast to an illegal intervention or 
use of force, the court ruled that both Nicaragua and the United States had not 
committed an armed attack by assisting irregular forces. The court did find, 
however, that the “sending” of armed rebel groups or “substantial 
involvement” in their attacks would justify the use of force in self-defense.283 
In the Nicaragua case, the court treated the Definition of Aggression with 
its provision “sending by or on behalf of a state or its substantial involvement 
therein” as definitive as to what amounted to an armed attack. According to the 
Nicaragua court, the United States would be held responsible for the actions of 
the irregular armed groups if it had “effective control” of the specific 
operations in question.284 In contrast, the United States would not be held 
responsible for the actions of the contra forces, according to the court, merely 
because it had a “preponderant or decisive” control over their operations in 
general. The court did not rule on whether any lesser level of state 
involvement, such as acquiescence or an inability to control armed bands 
operating in its territory, could be enough to constitute an armed attack. Rather, 
the court held that only if it could be shown that the United States “had 
effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of 
which the alleged violations were committed” could the United States be held 
responsible for the actions of those groups.285 
One implication of the court’s ruling is that as long as the supporting state 
refrains from controlling the group’s specific actions, it will be free from a 
self-defense use of force action from the victim state. While the supporting 
state would still be responsible for its actions, and the victim state would be 
able to seek reparations or other remedies from the other state, according to the 
court’s ruling, the victim state would be prohibited from lawfully acting in 
self-defense and using force. The legal framework provided by the court will 
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likely fail to act as any deterrent for aggressor states using non-state actors as 
proxies in cyber operations, as the Chinese have been reported to be doing.286 
After the court’s decision in the Nicaragua case, the U.N. International 
Law Commission adopted the Articles on State Responsibility, which argued 
that a state would be responsible for the acts of “organs of a State” or of 
“persons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority,” as well as 
“conduct directed or controlled by a State.”287 Later on in the Armed Activities 
on the Territory of the Congo Case, the court applied this test and found that 
the Court had not received “probative evidence that Uganda controlled, or 
could control, the manner in which [the Congo Liberation Movement] put such 
assistance to use.”288 One positive implication from the court’s decision is that 
attacks by armed bands or irregulars directly or indirectly supported by a state 
gives rise to a right of defense against that state.289 However, another 
implication is that the court may not recognize any right of defense against 
attacks from rebel groups operating from the territory of a state where that state 
is not directly or indirectly involved with the attacks.290 
The court leaves unanswered the question whether the court intended to 
prohibit targeting the state itself when the state is not involved or unable to 
stop the attacks, or whether the court meant to prohibit more broadly any 
action within the other state in response to the attacks. If the latter, the court’s 
decision would significantly limit a state’s right of self-defense under the U.N. 
Charter. Particularly in the cyber context, such an interpretation would leave 
victim states at a significant disadvantage against those states that carry out 
aggressive cyber attacks through either state-owned entities or private 
hackivists. 
As international courts have developed, there has been little difference in 
the substantive legal decisions of the different courts. With respect to the issues 
related to non-state actors and state responsibility, however, the ICJ and the 
ICTY did differ on one substantive legal point that has particular significance 
in the context of armed conflict. The difference related to the test for 
 
 286 Thomas, supra note 110, at 101. 
 287 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 256, arts. 5, 8.  
 288 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, para. 
16 (Dec. 19). 
 289 See id. paras. 134, 144–47. 
 290 Id. para. 146 (“The Court has found . . . . .that there is no satisfactory proof of the involvement in these 
attacks, direct or indirect, of the Government of the DRC. . . . [E]ven if this series of deplorable attacks could 
be regarded as cumulative in character, they still remained non-attributable to the DRC.”). 
LOTRIONTE GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/28/2013 1:28 PM 
880 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
determining the responsibility of a state or its officials for actions taken by a 
non-state entity over which the state exercised significant influence or control. 
Under the Nicaragua standard, as mentioned above, a state cannot be held 
responsible for the actions of a non-state actor merely because it had general 
control over their operations. Rather, the court held in that case that the United 
States could only be held responsible under circumstances where it was proved 
that the United States had “effective control of the military or paramilitary 
operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed.”291 
In contrast, in 1999, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia concluded in the Tadić case that the 
Nicaragua test of “effective control” was “at variance with judicial and State 
practice,” and instead decided that: 
In order to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary group to a 
State, it must be proved that the State wields overall control over the 
group, not only by equipping and financing the group, but also by 
coordinating or helping in the general planning of its military 
activity. . . . However, it is not necessary that, in addition, the State 
should also issue, either to the head or to members of the group, 
instructions for the commission of specific acts contrary to 
international law.292 
The Tadić court ruled that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“FRY”) did 
exercise the required overall control over the Bosian Serb Army “in terms of 
participation in the general direction, coordination and supervision of the 
activities and operations” of that Army.293 In this case, the ICTY determined 
that in order to bring responsibility to the State of Yugoslavia based on the 
actions of the Bosian Serbs, there was not any need to “prove that each 
operation during which acts were committed in breach of international law was 
carried out on the FRY’s instructions, or under its effective control.”294 In this 
case of finding criminal liability for the accused, the ICTY found that a lesser 
standard of attribution of state complicity in the acts of the non-state actor 
could be used in order to hold the state responsible. 
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Some scholars have pointed out that the courts have appeared to develop 
two different standards by which to assess attribution from non-state actors to 
the state.295 Under the Nicaragua court standard, a state is responsible for the 
acts of non-state actors where it has “effective control” over the actors.296 
Under this standard as applied in the context of cyber activities, the provision 
of cyber expertise or training, alone, by the state to the non-state actor in the 
planning of specific cyber attacks against another state would likely not be 
enough to give rise to state responsibility for the wrongful acts committed by 
the non-state actor.297 In contrast, under the Tadić standard, as some scholars 
have pointed out,298 the ICTY created a lower threshold of “overall control” in 
the context of individual criminal responsibility and for determining the nature 
of the armed conflict.299 If the Tadić standard were applicable within the cyber 
context where states are actively funding cyber attacks against U.S. computer 
systems and providing money and political cover for young hackers trained to 
attack these computer networks, it is likely that with the lower threshold 
applied, the states would be found responsible for the hackers’ actions. 
This position that there exists two different standards for determining state 
responsibility has been challenged by the court in the Genocide case. In 2007, 
the ICJ in the Genocide case ruled on the issue of the degree to which Serbia 
could be held responsible for actions by Bosnian Serb forces.300 In reviewing 
the previous decision by the ICTY in the Tadić case, the ICJ ruled that the 
“overall control” test applied in the Tadić case was suitable for the Tadić court 
to invoke since it was ruling on whether the FRY involvement was so 
substantial as to rule the conflict in Bosnia as international in character.301 The 
ICJ noted that the application of the “overall control” standard by the ICTY in 
a case determining criminal liability of individuals and assessing the 
international nature of the conflict was appropriate. But the ICJ drew a 
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distinction based upon the different jurisdictions of the courts and found that 
applying the same “overall control” test in a case dealing with state 
responsibility under international law, the Genocide case, would be 
“unpersuasive.”302 
The ICJ concluded that the “overall control” test—the lower threshold—
was unsuitable for determining state responsibility for wrongful actions of non-
state actors “for it stretches too far, almost to breaking point, the connection 
which must exist between the conduct of a state’s organs and its international 
responsibility.”303 The court went on to rule that the FRY was not responsible 
for specific violations committed by these entities, notwithstanding the 
considerable influence and control that the FRY exercised over them.304 Even 
if the overall control test were applied, the required control by the state would 
need to go beyond “the mere financing and equipping of such forces and 
involv[e] also participation in the planning and supervision of military 
operations.”305 
One negative implication of the courts’ different interpretations of 
standards is that states are given the opportunity to carry out criminal policies 
through non-state actors while escaping from direct responsibility.306 As the 
Vice-President of the Court, Judge Al-Khasawneh noted in his dissent: 
When . . . the shared objective is the commission of international 
crimes, to require both control over the non-State actors and the 
specific operations in the context of which international crimes were 
committed is too high a threshold. The inherent danger in such an 
approach is that it gives States the opportunity to carry out criminal 
policies through non-state actors or surrogates without incurring 
direct responsibility therefore.307 
For criminal purposes the court has indicated that the lower level of control 
will be used (the overall control test) but, for assessing state responsibility, the 
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higher threshold will be used (the effective control test).308 The higher 
threshold will likely allow states to avoid being held responsible for actions 
that non-state actors have taken on their behalf. Another implication of the 
courts decisions will be to make it difficult for states as well as non-state 
actors, to understand the relevant standards related to state responsibility and to 
act within the legal boundaries.309 This poses difficulty for decisions-makers 
who are trying to comply with the law. Certainly, the principle of state 
responsibility should not require a state to intervene to prevent all violations by 
other entities just because it has the capability to do so. However, a state 
should have some responsibility to act where attacks are being carried out 
against other states by an entity over which it exercises overall control and 
provides essential support. 
When a state knows or has reason to know that entities under its overall 
control are carrying out harmful and illegal actions against another state, or are 
likely to, that state should have the responsibility to take reasonable actions to 
prevent or terminate those actions. It should not be up to that state to deny all 
responsibility simply because it did not order or control the specific operation 
in which the violation occurred. To find otherwise would effectively overrule a 
state’s obligation recognized under customary international law to do no harm 
to others.310 The critical question is what would constitute reasonable actions 
by the state. The standard provided at the end of this Article seeks to address 
this issue. 
In the ICJ’s Genocide decision there is one potentially useful standard that 
the court employed related to the question of the FRY’s responsibility for acts 
of genocide committed by other individuals and entities to which it gave 
considerable support and over which it exercised considerable influence.311 
Although the court had previously asserted that states could only be held 
responsible for acts by other entities if the actions were “in accordance with the 
States’ instructions or under its ‘effective control,’”312 on the issue of genocide 
the court accepted a lower standard for holding state responsible for acts of 
genocide under the Genocide Convention.313 With respect to the obligation “to 
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prevent” genocide, the court adopted a different standard for state 
responsibility.314 Under this standard, the court ruled: 
[R]esponsibility is however incurred if the State manifestly failed to 
take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, 
and which might have contributed to preventing the genocide. In this 
area the notion of “due diligence”, which calls for an assessment in 
concreto, is of critical importance.315 
In assessing whether a state has carried out its obligation to prevent 
genocide, the Court provided the following criteria: (1) the capacity of the state 
to influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit genocide, (2) the 
geographic distance of the state from the scene of the events, and (3) the 
strength of the political links, as well as other links, between the authorities of 
the state and the main actors in the events.316 Ultimately, the court found that 
the FRY had failed in its duty to prevent the massacre at Srebrenica. The court 
concluded: 
[T]he FRY was in a position of influence over the Bosnian Serbs who 
devised and implemented the genocide in Srebrenica . . . owing to the 
strength of the political, military and financial links between the FRY 
on the one hand and the [Bosnian Serb entities] of the 
other . . . . [T]he Belgrade authorities . . . could hardly have been 
unaware of the serious risk.317 
The court noted, however, that a state’s “capacity to influence” must also be 
assessed by the legal limits the state is obligated to follow under international 
law in taking any action.318 Although the court did not explain what it meant 
by this, it seems to imply that a state may not use force against another state to 
prevent genocide if such use of force would otherwise be unlawful. Although 
this case dealt with obligations of a state to prevent genocide, the criteria 
developed by the court will be useful in assessing whether a state has done 
enough to prevent cyber attacks from emanating from its state and harming 
another state. 
For the purposes of attribution for state responsibility, it may be that 
initially limited, available evidence will not allow a clear “control” link to be 
made between the state and the non-state actors. In cyberspace, particularly 
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where a state may respond in self-defense, even acknowledging publicly that it 
is doing so, under the court’s rulings the victim state may be held responsible 
for an act of aggression unless the state is able to show proof that the state is 
acting in response to armed attacks by the state.319 Especially in cyberspace 
where the ability to identify the attacker with certainty will be difficult if not 
impossible, without a consensus on the rules related to state responsibility, 
states may be left with the choice of either doing nothing (likely not to happen 
if the state has suffered severe cyber attacks) or taking action in self-defense 
and risking a court or the international community finding that the state 
violated international law. 
If evidence is not readily available at the time of the attacks, however, it is 
possible for the victim state to use information gathered after the attacks in 
order to make a case for the right to use force in self-defense. The court in the 
Diplomatic Hostages case indicated that acts may be attributed to the state 
retroactively.320 In November 1979, a group of Islamist students and militants 
took over the American embassy in Tehran and held fifty-two Americans 
hostage for 444 days.321 Although originally the state had not directed or been 
involved with the attack against the U.S. embassy, Ayatollah Khomeini had 
supported what the group was doing.322 
The court found that the state was responsible for the actions of the group 
that was holding the hostages and held that the state was required to stop the 
students.323 After the fact, if a state provides approval and support helping to 
perpetuate the unlawful acts of a non-state actor within it territory, that state 
can be held responsible for those actions even if the state did not originally 
direct them.324 
Even accepting that there may exist a right of self-defense against non-state 
actors, there exists a debate under international law about the extent of a victim 
state’s right of self-defense against these actors that reside in the territory of 
another state. For instance, in the Corfu Channel case the court attributed 
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actions related to the laying of the mines to Albania since it “should have 
known” about the mines,325 and the Court found that Albania violated its duty 
not to allow its territory to be used to harm another state.326 The court, 
however, also significantly limited the victim state’s right of self-defense by 
finding that Great Britain violated the sovereignty of Albania by sweeping for 
mines in the Channel without Albania’s consent.327 International legal scholars 
have argued that the court, in limiting Great Britain’s right of self-defense to 
sweep the mines and use force necessary to promptly end the illegal attacks 
against shipping, undermined the legal norms of the U.N. Charter against 
aggression.328 It may be that in ruling in this manner, the court also 
undermined its own authority since states will not silently accept aggressive 
attacks. 
In the Congo case, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC” or “the 
Congo”), brought an action against Uganda for unlawful use of force within 
the Congo.329 Uganda, however, claimed that it was using force in self-defense 
against armed attacks by non-state actors, the irregular forces of the Allied 
Democratic Forces, from the territory of the DRC in the period from August 
1998 till June 2003. Uganda argued it had the right of self-defense against 
irregular armed forces and Congolese-government supported forces because 
they were attacking into Uganda from the Congo.330 The Congo claimed that 
the attacks were the actions of an independent, non-state military force, the 
Allied Democratic Forces.331 Uganda argued that the Allied Democratic Forces 
were supported by the Congo.332 The court accepted arguments made by the 
Congo when it denied that it had any role in the attacks.333 
The court, in following the same approach as the Nicaragua court, found 
there was a lack of evidence provided by Uganda that would show that the 
DRC was supporting the groups that were attacking Uganda. In invoking the 
Definition of Aggression Article 3(g), it concluded that on the evidence before 
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it the attacks were not attributable to the DRC. Therefore, the court found that 
Uganda did not have the right of self-defense against the DRC.334 The court in 
its decision, however, expressly avoided the questions whether there may be an 
armed attack by non-state actors in the absence of state involvement, and what 
measures a state may take against such an attack.335 The decision of the court 
implied that attacks by bands or irregulars directly or indirectly supported by a 
state could give rise to a right of defense against the state.336 Unfortunately, the 
court left unanswered whether there is any right of self-defense against attacks 
from rebel groups operating from the territory of a state where the state is 
neither directly nor indirectly involved with the attacks. The court found “no 
satisfactory proof of the involvement in these attacks, direct or indirect, of the 
Government of the DRC. The attacks did not emanate from armed bands or 
irregulars sent by the DRC or on behalf of the DRC . . . .”337 
This passage from the case suggests that the court does not recognize a 
right of the victim state to use force against a state from whose territory an 
armed group is conducting attacks if that state had not “sent” the groups or was 
not “involved” in the attacks in question. The implication from the Congo 
decision is that it would be illegal to target the state itself when that state is not 
involved with any insurgent attacks from its territory and is unable to end those 
attacks. For example, in the cyber context, responsive distributed denial of 
service (“DDOS”)338 attacks against a state’s networks would not be 
appropriate unless there was evidence that the state sponsored the attacks by 
the non-state actors. The question left unanswered by the court, however, is 
whether the victim state can target the non-state actors responsible for the 
attacks (not the state itself) within the other state’s territory. 
The Congo decision ought not stand for the proposition that victim states 
have no right of response under self-defense on the territory of another state 
(from which the attacks are coming) against the groups operating from the 
territory of that state. For example, a state ought to be allowed to use cyber 
tools to take down the networks in the target state used by the individuals 
carrying out the cyber attacks against the victim state. The victim state would 
 
 334 Id. para 147.  
 335 Id.  
 336 See id. paras. 130–47. 
 337 Id. para. 146 (emphasis added). 
 338 A distributed denial of service is an attack which “attempt[s] to prevent the legitimate use of a 
service,” such as the Internet. See Jelena Mirkovic & Peter Reiher, A Taxonomy of DDoS Attack and DDoS 
Defense Mechanisms, COMPUTER COMM. REV., April 2004, at 39, 40. 
LOTRIONTE GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/28/2013 1:28 PM 
888 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
be taking those networks down in order to stop the threat coming from those 
networks. The language of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter does not distinguish 
between armed attacks conducted by a state from ones conducted by non-state 
actors.339 Also, the U.N. Security Council resolutions after 9/11 clearly 
preserved the right of self-defense against a non-state actor under Article 51.340 
In a case the year before the Congo decision, the court provided an 
advisory opinion on the legality of the wall that Israel had begun constructing 
in 2002 to cordon off the West Bank in response to an ongoing wave of 
terrorist attacks.341 Like in the Congo case, the court avoided any specific 
ruling on the possibility of self-defense against an armed attack by non-state 
actors. However, in its opinion, the court gave only a very brief discussion of 
self-defense, such that some have interpreted the court’s ruling as a rejection of 
any doctrine of self-defense against an armed attack by non-state actors.342 
The issue before the court was whether Israel had the right of self-defense 
to create the wall to prevent the ongoing terrorist attacks against it. In its 
opinion, the court stated: 
Article 51 of the Charter . . . recognizes the existence of an inherent 
right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against 
another State. However, Israel does not claim that the attacks against 
it are imputable to a foreign State. . . . Consequently, the Court 
concludes that Article 51 of the Charter has no relevance in this 
case.343 
The court reached its conclusion finding against any right of self-defense for 
Israel because the alleged aggressor was not a state.344 As far as Article 51 was 
concerned, according to the court, a non-state actor could not conduct an 
“armed attack” as defined in Article 51.345 Although nothing in the language of 
Article 51 indicates such a limitation, the implication of the court’s ruling on 
 
 339 See U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 340 S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 156. 
 341 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9). 
 342 Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?, 99 
AM. J. INT’L L. 62, 63 (2005); Ruth Wedgwood, The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Security Fence and 
the Limits of Self-Defense, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 52, 58 (2005). 
 343 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 
136, para. 139.  
 344 Id. 
 345 Id. 
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this was that there is no right of defense against aggression perpetrated by non-
state actors. 
The court cited no legal authority for its restrictive reading of the U.N. 
Charter’s right of self-defense. Nor did the court recognize that its decision 
was at odds with a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions in response to 
the 9/11 attacks.346 As discussed previously, on September 12, 2001, the 
Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1368, condemning the 
attacks and invoking the right of self-defense in calling on the international 
community to combat terrorism.347 The resolution does not limit its application 
to terrorist attacks by state actors only. In the days following the U.S. invasion 
of Afghanistan, the U.N. Security Council condemned the Taliban regime “for 
allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base for the export of terrorism by the Al-
Qaida network . . . .”348 In U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373, the Council 
made it clear that “international terrorism[] constitute[s] a threat to 
international peace and security”349 while “[r]eaffirming the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United 
Nations . . . .”350 
Without evidence of direct Taliban support or control over al Qaeda, the 
U.N. Security Council passed resolutions 1368 and 1373 invoking the principle 
of self-defense under Article 51 and supporting the legal authority of a victim 
state to use force in the sovereign territory of another state because of the 
actions of a non-state actor within that state.351 The ICJ’s opinion seems to 
ignore the Security Council’s position on this point. Arguably, the Security 
Council, whose resolutions are legally binding and whose membership 
represents the membership of the United Nations, ought to hold greater weight 
in its legal pronouncements, compared to an advisory opinion by the ICJ, 
which is not legally binding under international law. 
It would be difficult to imagine that a state that has been attacked by a non-
state actor would not invoke its right to respond in self-defense against the 
attackers, no matter where they may be if the state from which they were 
attacking refused or was unable to do anything to stop the attackers. In the 
 
 346 See supra note 197; see also S.C. Res. 1377, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377 (Nov. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, 
supra note 68. 
 347 S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 156. 
 348 S.C. Res. 1378 pmbl., supra note 166. 
 349 S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 68, pmbl. 
 350 Id. 
 351 Id.; S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 156. 
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cyber context, imagine that a critical infrastructure like the water supply of a 
state has been compromised by a cyber attack, leaving the state without water 
supply to its population or with contaminated water. With the looming threat of 
loss of life, irreparable harm to its population, and further cyber attacks, the 
victim state would need to act expeditiously to stop the damage, including 
using force within the territory of the state from which the malicious code 
emanated from. 
If the state from which the cyber attack emanated is unwilling or unable to 
carry out its responsibility to prevent its territory from being used as a base for 
cyber attacks against other states, there is a right of individual and collective 
defense on the part of the attacked state against the source of the aggression. If, 
however, the state whose territory the aggressors are operating from is directly 
or indirectly involved in supporting the attacks, then the state itself can be a 
legal target of the victim state. Arguably, even if there is no involvement 
between the state and the aggressors operating within the state, the victim state 
has the right to exercise its right of defense against the aggressors themselves. 
To argue otherwise would in effect mean that the right of self-defense is 
meaningless. 
3. Requirements of Necessity and Proportionality Under Self-Defense 
If a victim state was to use force against those conducting the attacks from 
within another state, it would have to follow the requirements of necessity and 
proportionality. Although these principles are not codified within the U.N. 
Charter, they are considered part of customary international law.352 state 
practice has shown that the principles of necessity and proportionality have 
played a central role in state justification of the use of force in self-defense and 
in international responses to attacks. These principles of self-defense under 
international law also apply in the cyber domain for a state operating in self-
defense.353 
The “necessity” requirement of jus ad bellum is a prohibition against the 
use of force except when the victim state determines that non-forcible 
measures would not effectively stop the threat. In other words, there was no 
 
 352 E.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 
para. 147 (Dec. 19) (noting that military action against airports and towns was a disproportionate response to 
cross-border attacks); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 324, para. 43 (Nov. 6); Legality of 
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, para. 41 (July 8); Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 194 (June 27). 
 353 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 18 (manuscript rr. 14, 15). 
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other means to resolve the dilemma but by using force. If, for example, a 
victim state was to use force in self-defense within the territory of another state 
where the non-state actors were launching attacks, necessity requires that the 
state contemplating the use of force first assess whether non-forcible remedies 
such as diplomatic intervention with the state would stop the attacks or prevent 
future attacks. If through diplomatic discussions the state takes steps such as 
arresting those responsible for the attacks, thereby removing the threat, the 
victim state would no longer have a legal right to use force since it was no 
longer necessary to use force to stop the attacks. For example, in assessing 
whether Iran may have had a legal right to use force in self-defense against the 
state or states responsible for targeting its uranium facility with the Stuxnet 
worm, assuming a state was responsible, Iran would have no right of self-
defense once the cyber attack stopped and the threat of attacks no longer 
existed. If the victim state did use force after the attacks were over and the 
threat was no longer, it would likely be an act of reprisal and illegal under 
international law. If an attack is imminent, however, the circumstances may be 
that there is no time to pursue other measures and the victim state acts 
necessarily, invoking its right of self-defense. 
To avoid the appearance of a self-defense response being an act of reprisal, 
especially if the attacks appear to be complete with little evidence of their 
continuation, the victim state should formally complain to the state from which 
the attacks came from before using force. Before using any force in self-
defense, the victim state ought to complain to the state, notifying the state of 
the attacks and giving the state the opportunity to stop the cyber attacks from 
its territory. In complaining to the state about the threat the victim state will 
likely be able to rebut any argument that its actions in self-defense, if it 
ultimately resorts to force, were reprisals and seemingly unnecessary.354 
Although there is no such mandatory requirement for all self-defense responses 
under international law, the ICJ has found against United States’ use of force 
in self-defense where the United States failed to complain to the state about the 
threat. The court reasoned that the lack of a complaint was evidence that the 
use of force against the target was not necessary.355 
 
 354 Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. 324, paras. 73–76. In the Oil Platform case the court was not satisfied that 
the attacks on the platforms were necessary to respond to these incidents. The court said it found no evidence 
that the U.S had complained to Iran of the military activities of the platforms, which, the court suggested, 
meant that the targeting of the platforms was not seen as a necessary act. Id. 
 355 Taft, supra note 244 (arguing that the court’s statement related to the U.S. not complaining to Iran 
about the threats from the platforms was too restrictive under the principle of self-defense and without basis in 
international law and practice.). 
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In the case where an armed attack has already occurred, and the attacks are 
ongoing or the victim state believes that future attacks will occur, the criteria 
of the Caroline incident for invoking anticipatory self-defense does not need to 
be applied. Under this criteria, for the right to forcibly respond in anticipation 
of an attack a state needs to show “necessity of self-defence, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for 
deliberation.”356 The element of the standard requiring imminence, however, 
ought not be applied to a response to an attack that has already occurred. In 
fact, if the state believes that the attacks will continue, the state has the 
authority to act immediately in order to prevent further attacks as long as it can 
attribute the cause of the attack and its response is proportionate. 
It follows then that when acting under Article 51 self-defense authority, if 
an actual armed attack has already taken place, the imminent criteria of 
necessity would be moot. A victim state that suffered a devastating attack 
would likely not deliberate long if at all about alternative measures as long as it 
was certain about attribution and the likelihood of future attacks. In the cyber 
domain, where the threats from malicious computer code arise at lightning 
speed, the victim state may have no other choice but to respond immediately in 
order to stop further damage. The state would still be required to respond, 
however, with proportionate force to deter the threats. 
Proportionality under jus ad bellum requires that any forcible response in 
self-defense be limited in size and magnitude to what is reasonably necessary 
to achieve the permissible objectives of the self-defense operation.357 
Proportionality relates to the size, duration and target of the response. Only 
that force that is necessary to stop the threat can be used and nothing beyond 
what is required. The self-defensive measures are to be used to halt and/or 
repel the attacks and not to act in a retaliatory or punitive manner.358 
 
 356 Letter from Lord Ashburton, British Special Representative to the U.S., to Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y 
of State (July 28, 1842), reprinted in 30 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 195, 198 (1858) [hereinafter Caroline 
Letters] (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y 
of State, to Henry S. Fox, British Minister in Washington (Apr. 24, 1841), reprinted in 29 BRIT. & FOREIGN 
ST. PAPERS 1129, 1138 (1857)). 
 357 See DINSTEIN, supra note 182, 262–67; see also MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR: TRANSNATIONAL COERCION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 242 (1994); 
JOHN NORTON MOORE, CRISIS IN THE GULF: ENFORCING THE RULE OF LAW 158 (1992). 
 358 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 136, Annex at 122; Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States, supra note 136, at 12. In both resolutions, the General 
Assembly made it clear that reprisals are unlawful). See also S.C. Res. 188, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/5650 
(Apr. 9, 1964) (condemning reprisals as unlawful). 
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Compliance with this requirement will depend on the factual situation as it was 
known at the time by the victim state. 
Proportionality does not require the use of an equivalent level of force in a 
self-defense response. Nor does it require the use of the same types of 
weapons, the same number of armed forces, or that the actions be in the victim 
state’s own territory.359 Recently, the U.S. government has stated that if it 
suffers a cyber attack, the consequences of which would be equivalent to an 
armed attack in conventional combat, it would reserve the right to respond in 
self-defense to the cyber attack, including with kinetic force.360 As long as the 
kinetic force used in response was only to the level that was necessary to stop 
or prevent other attacks and there were no other non-forcible measures that 
could be used to stop the attacks, the response would be proportionate and 
legal.361 
Furthermore, a state that has suffered a cyber attack equivalent to an armed 
attack can use force electronically outside its territory through cyberspace 
against the attacker as long as non-forcible measures are not available to stop 
the threat. If, for example, “passive defense” security measures, non-forcible in 
nature, such as system access controls, data access controls, security 
administration, or secure system designs related to the victim’s own networks, 
could be implemented to stop or prevent other cyber attacks, the principle of 
necessity would prohibit the victim state from using any forcible cyber 
measures against the attacker. However, if passive defenses are not available or 
would be ineffective in stopping or preventing the attacks, the victim state 
could use forcible measures—cyber “active defenses,” such as electronically 
sending destructive viruses to the attacker’s computer—as long as the use of 
the active defenses were proportionate to the threat from the adversary.362 
According to some commentators, what matters in assessing proportionate 
actions is “the result to be achieved by the ‘defensive’ action, and not the 
 
 359 GRAY, supra note 188, at 150–55. 
 360 CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT, supra note 2. 
 361 See Taft, supra note 244, at 305–06 (arguing that “[t]here is no requirement . . . that a State exercising 
the right of self-defense must use the same degree or type of force used by the attacking State in its most recent 
attack” and that, instead, “the proportionality of the measures . . . is to be judged according to the nature of the 
threat being addressed). 
 362 Active defenses in cyber could involve the sending of destructive viruses to the adversary’s computer, 
manually or automatically, or packet-flooding the adversary’s machine. The malware used can be designed to 
shut down, damage or destroy the adversary’s computer networks, which would prevent the adversary from 
using those systems for future cyber attacks. See generally Matthew J. Sklerov, Responding to International 
Cyber Attacks as Acts of War, in INSIDE CYBER WARFARE supra note 43, at 45–76. 
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forms, substance and strength of the action itself.”363 However, there is 
agreement among commentators that there is only one legitimate goal for any 
self-defense response: to stop or prevent an attack. Any response that creates 
the impression that the action was intended to punish, embarrass or teach some 
broader lessen rather than to stop or prevent an attack, will be viewed as 
disproportionate.364 Therefore, the size, duration and target of the response all 
become relevant factors in making an assessment on proportionate actions 
under the circumstances. 
In the case of a state using force in response to attacks from non-state 
actors in another state’s territory, proportionality might require special 
measures be taken into consideration when determining the appropriate target. 
For example, in cases where there is uncertainty regarding the state’s 
complicity in the non-state actors attacks, the victim state should limit its 
attacks to the non-state actors and avoid or minimize the damage to the state’s 
population and resources. Targeting the specific perpetrators of the attacks 
versus the state’s assets or population would likely meet the proportionality 
test. In cyberspace this may entail avoiding the use force against state owned 
cyber assets or networks but seeking to use force against the specific 
computers, networks, assets of the attackers. 
In August 1998, the United States responded to al Qaeda’s attacks on its 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania with missile attacks on the terrorist training 
camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan. The United States 
reported its actions to the Security Council under Article 51. The United States 
stated that the attacks were carried out to prevent and deter future attacks and 
after repeated efforts to convince Sudan and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan 
to shut down the terrorist facilities. The targets struck and the timing and 
methods of attack used were designed to comply with the rules of international 
law including the rules of necessity and proportionality.365 There was no action 
taken against the United States at the Security Council and response from the 
 
 363 Roberto Ago, Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/Add.5–7 
(1980), reprinted in 1980 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 13, 69, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1. 
 364 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, para. 74 (Nov. 6). Some judges in the Oil 
Platform case found the U.S. action to be unlawful reprisals, arguing that they were not necessary and 
proportionate. Judge Simma found that the U.S. actions were to teach Iran a broader lesson. Id. para. 15 
(separate opinion of Judge Simma). Judge Kooijmans found that the U.S. actions were punitive. Id. paras. 52, 
55, 62 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans). 
 365 See U.N. Security Council, Letter dated 20 August 1988 from the Permanent Representative of the 
United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/1998/780 (Aug. 20, 1988). 
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international community was muted. Some writers, however, objected, raising 
questions about the necessity of the U.S. response, arguing that U.S. action was 
not necessary since the attacks against the U.S. nationals were over at the time 
the United States responded.366 
In cyber operations, the deployment of computer code in self-defense 
targeted to stop an attack may pose a challenge when it comes to anticipating 
the second and third order effects of an act of self-defense. If in deploying 
malware in self-defense it is difficult to anticipate the possible consequences of 
the use of the code, compliance with the principle of proportionality may be 
complicated. For purposes of this discussion, assume that the Stuxnet worm 
was used in self-defense against Iran. In considering the factors size, duration, 
and target of the response of the Stuxnet worm, some of the challenges of 
proportional responses in cyber come to light. Critics of the Stuxnet cyber 
operation against Iran noted that the code was inadvertently released on the 
Internet, infecting many computers that were not the intended target.367 Aside 
from raising possible concerns about the necessity of the Stuxnet action this 
illustration raises issues related to the proportionality of the response. 
V. EFFECTIVE RESPONSES: STRENGTHENING NORMS OF STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY 
In the case of a major cyber attack that causes destruction to a state’s 
critical infrastructure, it is possible that the United States or any other country 
that has been targeted would want to respond. This could be either through 
diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, or, in very serious cases that reach the 
level of an armed attack, military action. Prior to 9/11, U.S. counterterrorism 
policy was based on law enforcement measures to prevent terrorist attacks.368 
This law enforcement-lead approach proved ineffective in stopping attacks 
against the United States. It may be the case that under certain circumstances 
 
 366 GRAY, supra note 188, at 197–98 (arguing that the U.S. response appeared to be reprisals meant to 
deter the terrorists and therefore in violation of the necessity requirement). 
 367 Although the U.S. government is suspected of launching the Stuxnet worm with the Israeli 
government, no government has taken credit for the operation so there is no evidence that a state is arguing a 
self-defense justification for the use of Stuxnet against Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities.  
 368 The State of Intelligence Reform Ten Years After 9/11: Hearing Before the H. Perm. Select Comm. on 
Intel., 112th Cong. (2011) (“Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the FBI’s operations were heavily weighted towards its 
law enforcement mission; intelligence tools and authorities were primarily used for the counterintelligence 
mission. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the FBI quickly identified the need to enhance intelligence 
programs with improved analytical and information sharing capacities to detect and prevent future terrorist 
attacks.”). 
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of a cyber attack against a state, the target state may determine that a military 
response would be necessary. This would be more likely when other efforts 
such as law enforcement measures have been deemed ineffective. While 
international law has recognized that non-state actors globally have the 
capacity to use catastrophic force that causes harm to states,369 in many ways, 
the Internet has increased the potential that non-state actors could cause such 
harm.370 
Just as some states support, tolerate, or harbor terrorists, there will likely be 
states that obstruct efforts to suppress cyber attacks coming from within their 
territory. These states frustrate transnational law enforcement efforts by 
shielding those responsible for cyber attacks from investigation, extradition, 
and prosecution. In combating cybercrime, the hardest problem is obtaining 
custody of criminals, without whom there can be no punishment or deterrence 
of future crimes. A preliminary, albeit limited, step to addressing cybercrime is 
the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime (“Cybercrime 
Convention”). The treaty requires state parties to criminalize certain cyber 
activity such as illegal access, interception and computer forgery and fraud.371 
The treaty also mandates that parties enter into extradition and mutual 
assistance agreements.372 As of June 2010, the treaty had only forty-six 
signatories and only thirty states had ratified it.373 Some experts agree that the 
treaty is unlikely to achieve worldwide acceptance.374 Importantly, two states 
of major concern with respect to cybercrime, Russia and China, have refused 
to sign the treaty.375 Among the signatories to the treaty, preserving 
sovereignty was a priority that led to the exclusion of any authorization for 
unilateral cross-border searches, even in the cases of emergency or hot 
pursuit.376 
Even with the Cybercrime Convention’s concerted effort to combat 
cybercrime, the particular challenges of investigating crime in the cyber 
 
 369 See supra Part II.B.1. 
 370 See supra Part I.B. 
 371 Abraham D. Sofaer, David Clark & Whitfield Diffie, Cyber Security and International Agreements, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS 185 (2010). 
 372 Id. 
 373 Id. 
 374 ROBERT K. KNAKE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERNET GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF CYBER 
INSECURITY 17 (2010). 
 375 Michael A. Vatis, The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, in PROCEEDINGS OF A 
WORKSHOP ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS, supra note 371, at 220. 
 376 See id. at 220, 221. 
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domain raises doubts as to the long-term effectiveness of a law enforcement 
approach to the cyber threats. As many cyber experts involved in international 
criminal cyber investigations have described, “[I]t is very difficult to solve 
cyber crimes due to cross-jurisdictional difficulties; lack of trained police, 
prosecutors and judges; [and] problems with digital forensics and 
evidence . . . .”377 In pointing out the limitations of the Cybercrime 
Convention, some have suggested that an international agreement on 
responsive defensive measures by victim states would be more effective.378 In 
circumstances where states may be complicit in criminal activity with little 
incentive to cooperate in any criminal investigation, the likelihood of detecting 
and stopping the perpetrators will be low. Such limitations constrain states in 
countering harmful cyber attacks carried out by state and non-state adversaries. 
The international rules governing the use of force also constrain victim 
states’ efforts to counter cyber attacks when those responsible for the attacks 
are located in the territory of uncooperative states. In April 2007 Russian 
hackers carried out cyber operations against Estonia, crippling the Estonian 
government and commercial computer networks. The Estonian Defense 
Minister claimed the distributed denial of service attacks were equivalent to a 
conventional military force closing down Estonia’s ports.379 He described the 
incident as “the first time that a botnet threatened the national security of an 
entire nation.”380 Some argued that these cyber operations against Estonia 
triggered the North Atlantic Treaty’s (“NATO”) Article 5, which declares that 
an attack against one member is an attack against all members.381 NATO, 
however, provided only limited recovery support after the DDOS attacks, 
leaving open the debate over whether Article 5 can be triggered by cyber 
attacks.382 
According to Estonia officials, Russia rejected numerous Estonian requests 
to help track down those responsible for the attacks, investigate the incident, or 
 
 377 Rattray & Healey, supra note 154, at 75. 
 378 Cf., e.g., Sofaer, Clark & Diffie, supra note 371. 
 379 Stephen Herzog, Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks: Digital Threats and Multinational Responses, 
J. STRATEGIC SEC., Summer 2011, at 49, 54. 
 380 Joshua Davis, Hackers Take down the Most Wired Country in Europe, WIRED (August 21, 2007), 
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-09/ff_estonia. 
 381 See, e.g., id.; see also North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. 
 382 Herzog, supra note 379, at 54 (noting that NATO’s Computer Emergency Response Team helped 
restore “normal network operations”); see also Davis, supra note 380. 
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stop the attacks against Estonia.383 To date, attribution directly to the Russian 
government has not been possible. While no direct links to the Russian 
government were uncovered, the attacks were linked to nationalist groups 
“following instructions provided on Russian-language Internet forums and 
websites.”384 At least one group involved in the attacks had links to the 
Russian government.385 Such connections, however, would likely not reach the 
level of “control” (by the government over the actions of the non-state actors 
responsible for the attacks) necessary to hold Russia responsible under 
international law. Yet requiring a victim state to show with “clear and 
convincing evidence” the direct ties between the government and the hackers, 
which may be impossible in the cyber domain, would significantly restrict a 
state’s right to respond in self-defense. 
In August 2008, Russian military forces invaded Georgia.386 Prior to the 
military invasion, the Russians carried out DDOS attacks on Georgian 
computer systems, which “rerouted [Internet traffic] through Russian-
controlled servers and blocked” Georgian government, media, and commercial 
sites.387 As with the cyber attacks against Estonia, attribution to the Russian 
government has not been possible, although some circumstantial evidence 
suggests that the Russian government was involved in directing, sponsoring, 
and paying Russian youth groups to carry out the cyber operations against 
Georgia.388 According to reports, the attackers who were affiliated with 
Russian organized crime were “tipped off about the timing of the Russian 
military operations while these operations were being carried out.”389 In this 
way, the Russian government can maintain plausible deniability for the cyber 
attacks, distancing the state from the hackers while passively supporting their 
actions. Among cyber experts, it is widely thought that Russian government 
 
 383 ENEKEN TIKK, KADRI KASKA & LIIS VIHUL, INTERNATIONAL CYBER INCIDENTS: LEGAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 27–28 (2010), available at http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/books/legalconsiderations. 
pdf. For a detailed discussion of the Estonia case, see id. 
 384 Id. at 33. 
 385 Charles Clover, Kremlin-backed Group Behind Estonia Cyber Blitz, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2009), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/57536d5a-0ddc-11de-8ea3-0000779fd2ac.html. 
 386 Daniel J. Ryan et al., International Cyberlaw: A Normative Approach, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1161, 1165, 
(2011). 
 387 Id. 
 388 GREYLOGIC, PROJECT GREY GOOSE PHASE II REPORT: THE EVOLVING STATE OF CYBER WARFARE 20–
21 (2009), available at http://www.fserror.com/pdf/GreyGoose2.pdf. 
 389 U.S. CYBER CONSEQUENCES UNIT, OVERVIEW BY THE US-CCU OF THE CYBER CAMPAIGN AGAINST 
GEORGIA IN AUGUST OF 2008 3 (2009), available at http://www.registan.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/US-
CCU-Georgia-Cyber-Campaign-Overview.pdf. 
LOTRIONTE GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/28/2013 1:28 PM 
2012] SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DEFENSE IN CYBER SPACE 899 
security services were behind both the Estonia and Georgia cyber 
operations.390 
These events illustrate the obstacles involved in transnational law 
enforcement efforts to combat cyber attacks and the current international legal 
constraints upon states to act in self-defense when adversary states purposely 
cause or have others cause harm to their territory. A state’s unwillingness to 
suppress cyber attacks originating within its territory has been used as a shield 
to deny responsibility for state action, thereby limiting the victim state’s right 
of self-defense. The difficulties of attribution in cyber operations challenge 
some of the basic assumptions of international law related to use of force in 
self-defense and state responsibility. 
In 2010, the Stuxnet malware infected computers used in the Iranian 
nuclear program. Cyber security experts have concluded that, based upon the 
complexity of the computer code, a state most likely developed the malware.391 
To date, there has been no clear evidence linking a particular state to the cyber 
operation, although some have suggested that the United States and Israel were 
behind the operation.392 The effect of the malware was to cause centrifuges to 
malfunction and ultimately slow down the Iranian government’s unlawful 
nuclear program.393 
Stuxnet is the first reported incident of a successful cyber operation against 
state control systems that support the functioning of critical infrastructure.394 
According to former and current U.S. government officials, however, there 
likely have been many attempts against the United States’ critical 
infrastructure already. Richard Clarke, former national security White House 
advisor under the Clinton and Bush administrations, warned of the Chinese 
embedding a “logic bomb” on the U.S. power grid.395 If the Chinese had 
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activated this computer malware, the ramifications of taking down portions of 
the U.S. power grid would have been potentially catastrophic. 
The cases of cyber attacks against Estonia and Georgia demonstrate that an 
effective strategy to combat cyber attacks by non-state actors requires a 
mechanism for preventing states from supporting or turning a blind eye to 
cyber attacks emanating from within. The case of Stuxnet illustrates the 
capability of cyber tools to comprise critical aspects of a state’s national 
security. As these recent events have revealed, the utility of law enforcement 
measures and criminal law is seriously limited when states refuse to cooperate 
in investigations and attribution is a significant challenge for victim states to 
prove. As mentioned previously, under international law, states can be held 
accountable for the acts of private individuals who carry out attacks from their 
territory and cause harm in another state. Under circumstances where law 
enforcement measures are deemed ineffective in holding a state accountable 
for stopping the threat, what are the options under international law for the 
victim state to defend its territory against such threats? 
Historically, the international principle of state responsibility has been 
based on a finding that if the state had direct control over the offending non-
state actor, and attribution to the state was feasible, others could hold the state 
culpable for the offending non-state actor’s actions.396 The international court 
decisions that utilized this standard of “effective control” in holding the state 
responsible, however, did not envision the possibility or impact of modern 
terrorism or the use of the Internet to cause grave harm to states. Certainly, 
finding a clear case of effective control by a state over a non-state group will 
likely be impossible in cyberspace, where communications can be made 
instantly, funds can be shifted relatively anonymously, and actions can be 
routed globally.397 Additionally, “notions of ‘location’ and ‘distance’ are only 
loosely correlated between real space and cyberspace . . . [and] files 
themselves may be distributed across cyberspace, and the number of steps 
changes with both the specific hyperlinks and with time as loading of the 
Internet packet switches changes.”398 
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In the cyber domain, while states can trace an attack back to a server in 
another state, identifying who is at the other end of the electronic connection 
directing the attack can be very difficult and time consuming.399 With the 
passage of time, those responsible can destroy evidence eliminating any 
possible paper trail for investigative purposes. Even when a cyber attack can be 
attributed to a non-state actor, a victim state seeking not to violate the 
sovereignty principle is dependent on the assistance of the host state to 
investigate the attack.400 Unfortunately, a lack of state cooperation has limited 
a state’s ability to respond to an attack and comply with international law. 401 
The primary means through which states have attempted to resolve the 
dilemma is through criminal laws.402 The most uncooperative states, however, 
have been unwilling to enact domestic criminal laws outlawing cyber attacks 
or have failed to prosecute those who have violated the laws.403 
States that fail to take the initiative to prevent cybercrime and cyber attacks 
can be held responsible for any breach to international peace and security 
caused by resulting cyber operations.404 It may not be realistic, however, to 
expect states to be able to completely prevent cyber attacks by non-state actors 
within their territory from ever occurring. Therefore, the dispositive factor in 
implementing the norm of state responsibility and evaluating whether the state 
has fulfilled its duty to prevent non-state actors from conducting cyber attacks 
from its territory will be in changing the conduct of the host-state itself when 
addressing potential threats. As the norm of state responsibility has evolved 
since 9/11, a state may be found to have breached its duties not only through 
affirmative efforts, but also through what it failed to do to prevent the threat 
from materializing.405 Passiveness or indifference by the host state to the 
activities of cyber hackers could thus result in the state being held responsible 
for the effects of the cyber attack even though the state did not sanction the 
attacks. 
Creating a legal regime based upon the norm of state responsibility in 
cyberspace will be a challenge given the limited capabilities for attribution, the 
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lack of ability to have significant oversight, and the material power of those 
who are actively harboring and supporting hacker activity. However, 
establishing a standard for the norm of state responsibility in the context of 
cyber attacks with implied liability to the state based upon the actions of the 
state offers hope for a normative framework with which to diplomatically 
engage those states harboring hackers. 
Given that the U.N. Security Council could have authorized the use of force 
against al Qaeda under Article 42 of the U.N. Charter, it is significant that 
instead it did so under Article 51.406 This is of critical importance in the 
development of cyberspace responses. As individuals and non-state actors are 
more than capable of inflicting damage and undertaking cyber attacks, this has 
laid the groundwork for state retaliation against such attacks. Giving even 
greater support for the action against a non-state actor was the widespread 
international support for the U.S. military action in Afghanistan from 
organizations such as NATO and the Organization of American States, as well 
as numerous states such as Russia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.407 The international response to 9/11 seems to have 
eliminated the evidentiary problems involved in identifying the original act as 
wrongful and directly sponsored by the state, thereby justifying a military 
response to the attacks.408 From this new line of reasoning, once an attack is 
carried out to the detriment of the victim state, the international community 
will look at the issue more broadly as an attack emanating from another 
territory and focus on how the host state could have limited or avoided its 
responsibility for that attack. 
For counterterrorism policy, this standard offers a legal framework that is 
more practically viable than one based on a direct causal relationship between 
the non-state actor, al Qaeda, and the government, the Taliban.409 Based on this 
standard, if the Taliban could not demonstrate that it conducted its due 
diligence in trying to prevent al Qaeda from launching attacks from 
Afghanistan, then the Taliban would be in violation of its international 
obligations and thus be responsible for the 9/11 attacks. As with 
counterterrorism policy, this new framework for the norm of state 
responsibility for cyber attacks will be based on an ex post facto factual 
evaluation of the host state’s actions prior to the attack, to be performed on a 
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case-by-case basis. In assessing this new framework for the norm, there are 
steps a state can take prior to any attack emanating from its territory that, while 
not guaranteeing the prevention of all cyber attacks from occurring, may still 
lower its legal responsibility for the attack if an attack were to occur from 
within the state’s territory. Importantly, following these steps could lead to a 
more tempered response from the victim state. 
As more and more control systems become automated and people all over 
the world become reliant on cyber systems, the scope, veracity, and volume of 
malicious hacker activities are all likely to increase. There needs to be at least a 
basic norms-based framework in place for responding to these activities in 
order for a responsible diplomatic or military response to be formulated. In 
light of the challenges that cyberspace offers to the security of the international 
community, strengthening an international norm of state responsibility may 
provide the precise framework necessary for diplomatic negotiations and a 
more secure and accountable cyberspace environment. Given the decisions of 
the ICJ, as discussed above, and the court’s trend in its application of Charter 
norms concerning jus ad bellum (limiting a victim state’s right to respond in 
self-defense), it may be up to states to take a more active role. Recognizing 
that international law is not solely made by courts, but also by states, and given 
the importance of a legal structure to ensure order in the cyber domain and 
minimal aggression, states should respond by individually and collectively 
establishing the principles of state responsibility that will ensure that 
cyberspace does not become space for “secret wars” where states must forfeit 
their rights of self-defense or else be accused of violating international law. 
The standard offered in Part IV of this Article may assist the move in this 
direction through cooperative efforts. 
The central thrust of the diplomatic discussions on a norm of state 
responsibility relevant for cyber security would focus on the following host 
state’s actions: codifying domestic criminal legislation against hacking, 
utilizing these laws to prosecute those that break the law, cooperation with 
other nations in sharing information, and allowing others to investigate within 
the host state’s territory.410 Assessing state responsibility would examine 
whether these state actions were in line with the state’s legal obligations to 
prevent a cyber attack’s occurrence. Under this standard, while a host state 
may not be responsible for the acts of private individuals who have taken down 
a server in the United States, it will be responsible if it fails to take all 
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necessary steps to protect the security and misuse of the Internet in its country 
or to minimize and mitigate the damage caused by any misuse. 
As Howard Schmidt, the former White House cyber security coordinator, 
described in 2010, “One of the key things has been going back to the countries 
that it appears it’s coming from and saying: ‘If it’s not you, you need to 
investigate this.’”411 A state’s failure to take steps to investigate and stop the 
perpetrators can be followed by a measured response in self-defense.412 
International law allows for proportionate countermeasures in response to harm 
originating from a state,413 even if the government is not behind the harm.414 
Before a countermeasure is taken, however, the victim state may be required to 
make a determination about the target state’s reason for its failure to 
investigate, calling upon the target state to cease in the wrongful actions and 
offering assistance.415 
According to Article 49 (1) of the Articles of State Responsibility, the sole 
permissible purpose of countermeasures is to induce the responsible state to 
resume compliance with its international legal obligations. If the target state 
resumes its international legal obligations then the victim state can no longer 
continue countermeasures. In the case of cyber operations, for example, if the 
state lacks the resources to investigate cyber attacks from its territory, the 
victim state may be required to offer assistance to the target state before any 
forcible countermeasure would be justified. If the target state accepts the 
assistance the victim state may lose its right to invoke countermeasures since 
the target state appears to have resumed its international obligation to try to 
prevent harm to others from its territory. If, however, the offer of assistance 
was rejected by the other state, the victim state may respond with proportionate 
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force.416 Developing the requirement to offer assistance may help avoid 
forcible escalation in the case of cyber attacks. Furthermore, the availability of 
countermeasures in the context of cyber operations increases the available 
options of the victim state for a proportionate response that would be lawful.417 
IV.  LOOKING AHEAD 
The development of large-scale arms control treaties on cyber conflict does 
not seem probable, at least not for several decades. In the late 1990s, Russia 
first proposed a treaty banning espionage and the use of malicious code in 
cyber conflict.418 The United States, however, argued then that any new treaty 
in cyberspace would limit the United States’ ability to defend itself in a cyber 
conflict. Although today the United States is reconsidering its position,419 there 
are still some major hurdles to agreement on any new cyber treaty.420 Verifying 
compliance would be difficult if not impossible. Because attribution is so 
challenging in cyber operations, state signatories would be able to violate the 
terms of the treaty with little likelihood that the United States would be able to 
prove the violations.421 Yet the United States and others have recognized that a 
determined adversary acting in cyber could cause great damage to a state’s 
critical infrastructure.422 Concerns about the cyber threat are not limited to the 
actions from state adversaries. Cyber attacks from non-state actors, whether 
criminal syndicates, terrorists, or political hacktivists, are widely viewed as a 
core threat to world order and the security of the Internet. In practice, it seems 
likely that a nation severally harmed by a cyber attack would find support from 
other nations for an expanded right to self-defense; third-party states are not 
likely to deny a victim state military redress in the name of quickly changing 
international law. Certainly, state practice in this area will determine how the 
law develops. The norm of state responsibility can provide states with the 
 
 416 The majority of the Group of Experts concluded that “cyber countermeasures may not involve the 
threat or use of force . . . .” Id. (manuscript r. 9, para. 5). A minority of the Group of Experts accepted the 
approach of Judge Simma in the ICJ’s Oil Platforms case that proportionate countermeasures could involve a 
limited degree of military force. Id. (manuscript r. 9, para. 7). All Experts agreed that cyber countermeasures 
could not rise to the level of an “armed attack.” Id. (manuscript r. 9, para. 5). 
 417 Id. (manuscript r. 9, paras. 11–13). 
 418 A.A . Streltsov, International Information Security: Description and Legal Aspects, DISARMAMENT F., 
2007 no. 3, at 5, 6, available at http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2642.pdf. 
 419 See John Markoff & Andrew E. Kramer, In Reversal, U.S. Talks to Russia on Web Security, N.Y. 
TIMES, December 13, 2009, at A1.  
 420 Jack Goldsmith, Cybersecurity Treaties: A Speculative View, FUTURE CHALLENGES IN NAT’L 
SECURITY & L., 2011, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/FutureChallenges_Goldsmith.pdf. 
 421 Id.  
 422 Obama, supra note 3. 
LOTRIONTE GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/28/2013 1:28 PM 
906 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
opportunity to develop agreements on how such disputes are resolved and 
potentially limit the escalation of cyber conflict between states. 
The development of a norm (shared expectation of proper behavior) like 
state responsibility, however, offers the possibility of broader international 
participation, as norms are not written, contractual legal obligations. In 
normative development, the first step is to generate and obtain agreement on 
the norm particulars between like-minded states. Over time, other more 
reluctant states and organizations may become “socialized” into deeper 
acceptance of the norm, creating a spillover effect to other states as 
engagement on the issues becomes more widespread. As with international 
norms in other areas, the easier it is for states to comply with the norm, the 
more likely the norm will “cultivate” and spread. 
The United States has recently begun informal discussions with Russia and 
China, two states that generally do not agree with the United States’ position 
on cyber activities.423 These discussions can serve as a foundation upon which 
to build a greater consensus in the future. Although problems may arise from 
states still being in the early stages of learning and developing shared cyber 
norms, there is a remarkable similarity to the normative learning curve of the 
1950s at the beginning of the nuclear era.424 Building upon already existing 
norms about self-defense and the use of force will increase the likelihood of 
the norm’s acceptance. While the United States has begun the process of 
articulating and promulgating the norm of state responsibility, these steps are 
not sufficient to ensure changed behavior by states. Nevertheless, if the United 
States champions the norm, its status as a major stakeholder in cyber security 
will increase the likelihood of its dissemination and internalization by other 
states. These are necessary stages in normative development if state behavior is 
realistically expected to change. Furthermore, if states like the United States 
offer technical, investigative, or financial assistance to other states that lack the 
domestic resources to undertake investigations, it will be easier for some states 
to comply with the norm. This in turn will further the chances for the norm’s 
cultivation. As states like Russia and China engage diplomatically on the topic 
of state responsibility in the cyber domain, it may be possible to generate 
enough traction for other states to buy into the norm. Engaged discussion 
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between states could help develop common perceptions and more commonly 
agreed-upon norms. 
This Article has supported the notion of the evolution of the norm of state 
responsibility, as it developed after 9/11, in the context of cyber attacks. Aside 
from enhancing the legitimacy of international efforts to combat cyber attacks, 
this model would also foster states’ comparative policy-making and 
collaborative efforts. Under international law, multilateral collaboration should 
be preferred over unilateral state action in instilling a preventive character to 
forcible self-defense actions. In this spirit, states could engage in significant 
risk control and risk assessment of possible cyber attacks and, hopefully, 
encourage multilateral, or at minimum, initially bilateral exchanges of 
information and intelligence, along with financial “red-flagging” of cyber 
assets. In addition to sending a message of deterrence to complacent 
governments, this approach would also provide states with a forum to voice 
and test out their cyber security policies. As the 2011 International Cyber 
Space Strategy noted, “Cybersecurity cannot be achieved by any one nation 
alone, and greater levels of international cooperation are needed to confront 
those actors who would seek to disrupt or exploit our networks.”425 
A. A Standard for Determining When to Use Force Against a Non-State Actor 
1. The “Unwilling and Unable” Test Applied in International Armed 
Conflict Between Belligerents426 
The roots for the “unwilling or unable” test come from the neutrality laws 
that are applicable during international armed conflict.427 These laws are 
articulated in the Hague Conventions V and XIII and in customary 
international law.428 The purpose of the neutrality laws is to ensure that those 
states not participating in an armed conflict (neutrals) do not sustain injuries as 
a result of the conflict and their rights are protected. They also guarantee to 
those states in the conflict that the neutral states will not assist any of those 
parties in the conflict. For example, the neutrals are not to permit their territory 
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to be used by a party to the conflict as a safe harbor or a place from which to 
launch attacks.429 These laws seek to balance the right to engage in lawful 
operations with the right of neutral states to remain protected from the conflict. 
This is similar to the jus ad bellum principle seeking to balance a victim state’s 
right of self-defense with the right of territorial sovereignty of other states. 
Some have argued that the neutrality laws are no longer relevant in the 
post-Charter era.430 Even if the neutrality laws are “dead,” the purpose and 
intent of the laws are still relevant when non-state actors may be using the 
territory of a state (maybe innocent of committing any wrong doing or maybe 
supporting or sponsoring the illegal activity of the non-state actor) to conduct 
attacks. The prior existence of the “unwilling or unable” at least grounds the 
current use of the test in historical legal context. Importantly, because states 
use the language of the test today to justify uses of force against non-state 
actors, it is important to investigate the content of the test. 
Under these laws, neutral states must not permit belligerents to violate their 
territory and must take steps to quash such violations.431 If a belligerent group 
violates the territory of the neutral state, the neutral state is expected to use 
“due diligence” in its efforts to prevent violations of its neutrality.432 So 
assuming a state is not responsible for the attacks (i.e., it is neutral), then, in 
line with the purposes of these laws, that state must take steps to prevent the 
non-state actor from using its territory to commit attacks. If the neutral state 
uses the means at its disposal, it cannot be accused of violating international 
legal obligations and cannot incur state responsibility, even if it fails to repel 
the offending group.433 
However, what if the neutral state cannot fulfill its obligations in 
preventing a party to the conflict from using its territory to carry out attacks 
against another party to the conflict? The military manuals of states and 
opinions of commentators have recognized that states would not and could not 
tolerate being left with no recourse if the neutral state was not successful in 
repelling other belligerents from violating the neutral territory, thereby 
effectively launching attacks against the victim state.434 For instance, the 
military manuals of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada 
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specifically refer to the “unwilling or unable” test in assessing the right to 
recourse within the territory of a neutral state, establishing the norm as well-
embedded within state practice.435 The practice by states revealed that their 
interpretation of the neutrality laws meant that the victim state was permitted 
to use force on a neutral state’s territory if the neutral state was unable or 
unwilling to prevent violations of its neutrality by one party waging war 
against another state. 
The test of “unwilling or unable” was used by parties to a conflict to guide 
them in enforcing the neutrality laws in the face of violations by their enemies 
or by neutral states. The San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to 
Armed Conflict at Sea, drafted in 1995 by international legal experts but not 
binding law, addresses the unwilling or unable test and puts some restrictions 
upon the test. The manual states that when a neutral state fails to prevent a 
belligerent party from violating its neutral territorial waters, the state 
contemplating force must first give the neutral state notice and a reasonable 
time to terminate the violation before using force.436 Furthermore, the violation 
must constitute a serious and immediate threat, and there must not be any other 
alternatives besides using force in order to stop the violation.437 
2. The Test Applied in Use of Force Self-Defense Against Non-State Actors 
An early case using the test with respect to non-state actors was the 
Caroline incident. Often cited for providing the basic rules for using force in 
anticipatory self-defense, it also is an “unwilling and unable” test case. As 
Abraham Sofaer noted: 
The principal difference between them was the claim by the British 
that the [United States] was either unable or unwilling to stop the 
rebels within its territory from attacking Canada. The [United States], 
on the other hand, insisted that it was adequately fulfilling its 
obligation to prevent the rebels from attacking Canada from [U.S.] 
territory.438 
 
 435 See DEP’T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, para. 520, July 18, 
1956; OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN. (CANADA), LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL 
AND TACTICAL LEVELS, JOINT DOCTRINE MANUAL, para. 1304(3), August 13, 2001; U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., 
THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT- AMENDED TEXT 01/04, para. 13.9E (2004). 
 436 SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICT AT SEA, para. 22 
(Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995). 
 437 U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., supra note 435, 13.9E. 
 438 Abraham D. Sofaer, On the Necessity of Pre-emption, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 209, 216–17 (2003). 
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Recently, in the context of extrajudicial killings of terrorists, the Special 
Rapporteur for the U.N. Human Rights Council noted: 
A targeted killing conducted by one State in the territory of a second 
State does not violate the second State’s sovereignty if either (a) the 
second State consents, or (b) the first, targeting, State has a right 
under international law to use force in self-defence under Article 51 
of the UN Charter, because . . . the second State is unwilling or 
unable to stop armed attacks against the first State launched from its 
territory.439 
This “unwilling or unable” test is suitable to be applied to non-state actors 
during a time of peace as well as neutral states during a time of armed conflict. 
Although the sources of the duties under international law are different, the 
equities of the states at issue are the same and therefore the purpose and intent 
of the laws are what matters. The purpose of the neutrality laws is to ensure 
that neutral states during a time of international armed conflict do not allow 
their territory to be used by a belligerent party to the conflict in order to seek 
safe harbor to plan and carry out attacks against an enemy.440 The source of the 
duty on the neutral state comes from either a neutrality treaty to which it is a 
signatory or from customary international law. Under the laws related to use of 
force at a time of peace, the issue is ensuring that states do not allow their 
territory to be used by non-state actors to initiate and carry out armed attacks 
against the victim state. A state’s duty to prevent non-state actors from 
carrying out attacks from its territory comes from the international rule 
codified in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance 
with the Charter of the United States.441 
The principle of sovereignty requires that both neutral states during times 
of conflict and states during times of peace desire to preserve their territorial 
integrity. One might argue, as this Article as done, that this is part of the 
responsibility of all sovereign states. Both types of states are responsible for 
fulfilling their international legal obligations. Likewise, when a state has been 
attacked by non-state actors from another state’s territory, it does not matter 
whether that state is a belligerent in conflict or a victim state during a time of 
 
 439 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions para. 35, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add. 6 (May 28, 2010) (footnotes omitted). 
 440 See generally Deeks, supra note 276, at 497–501 (providing background information on the law of 
neutrality). 
 441 See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028, at 123 (Oct. 
24, 1970). 
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peace; both types of states have an interest in stopping the attacks and avoiding 
conflict with the neutral state. 
3. Developing a Standard 
Developing a workable standard for determining when it would be lawful 
to use force against a non-state actor in self-defense in another state’s territory 
after suffering a cyber attack would be useful considering that courts, scholars, 
and treaty law have not provided clear details for such a standard upon which 
state’s actions will be judged. To identify what a standard may look like, the 
rest of this Article will draw upon the case law, commentaries, state practice, 
and treaty and customary law principles to suggest specific criteria for the 
standard. 
The usefulness of such a standard ought to be clear. In the absence of clear 
legal guidance, a decision-maker is left wondering what criteria he ought to use 
when deliberating about the legality of the use of force under the 
circumstances. Knowing how to employ a test under international law properly 
is important if the goal is that the actions are considered legal and legitimate. A 
vague or broadly ambiguous test without content is meaningless. Hopefully, 
the criteria offered in this Article will be useful to determine what assessments 
a victim state should make before using force against a non-state actor within 
the territory of another state in the context of a cyber attack, and also how the 
victim state should make those assessments. 
As international law scholars have noted, international norms are more 
likely to be viewed as legitimate if there is clarity about where the boundary 
exists between what is permissible under the norm and what is not. According 
to Thomas Franck, for example, when there is no ascertainable understanding 
about what is permitted or prohibited by an international norm, “states are 
unlikely to defer opportunities for self-gratification. The rule’s compliance pull 
evaporates.”442 Some practical benefits to the victim state in utilizing the 
criteria offered below are that the victim state would have the opportunity to 
acquire and assess information on the target state that it otherwise would not 
have known, it would improve its decisional process with specific action items, 
and, importantly, it would be able to defend its actions before the Security 
Council, international courts, or other states, against a clear standard. In effect, 
criteria allow victim states to “build a case” for a legal self-defense response. 
 
 442 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 88, 93 
(2006). 
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Certainly, however, one does not want a test so undefined that it would 
allow victim states to abuse it by using the broad terms of “unable or 
unwilling” to justify the use of force when the target state in fact was able and 
willing to act to stop the attacks. Nor does one want such broad language of an 
undefined test to be used as a whip against a victim state that has been attacked 
and used force in self-defense in good faith, trying to follow the test, and then 
is punished by an international court or public outcry. Or, it may be that a 
victim state with a legitimate right to use force under the test refrains from 
doing so and leaves itself undefended against real threats because of 
uncertainty of the meaning of the test or expectations by international bodies 
about the test. In practice, this last scenario is unlikely to happen when the 
victim state’s national security is at risk because a victim state will likely 
ignore a test that fails to provide for a legitimate right of self-defense when 
national security is at stake. The danger in this case is that if a state ignores the 
test, there will be even more uncertainty about the law and its applicability 
could possibly lead to more uses of force than necessary. 
As this Article stated at the beginning, the goal here is to provide a test that 
would produce an appropriate balance between the right of sovereignty and a 
victim state’s right of self-defense. As mentioned previously, there exists a 
tension between the two, particularly in the area of use of force. However, 
these factors for a better understanding of the test may help find the 
appropriate balance between these two principles of international law. 
The U.N. report, A More Secure World, recommended that the U.N. 
Security Council adopt guidelines to govern when it would authorize the use of 
force, and thereby increase the legitimacy of those authorizations.443 As state 
practice and U.N. Security Council inaction in the area of use of force 
continues, it will likely be states more often than the U.N. Security Council 
that will be making decisions (unilaterally or collectively) about whether to use 
force. While the report’s recommendation was important for the Security 
Council, such a test is arguably more readily needed by states. Unfortunately, 
based upon the international court cases discussed previously in this Article, 
the courts do not appear likely to deliver a clearly defined test for states to 
follow. Most likely it will be up to states, through practice, to develop the law 
in this area and, hopefully, they can produce a clearer test by doing so. States 
may do a service to the U.N. Security Council and international courts by using 
such a test, for in assessing the legality of the actions of a state after the fact, 
 
 443 U.N. Report, A More Secure World, supra note 1, at 57. 
LOTRIONTE GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/28/2013 1:28 PM 
2012] SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DEFENSE IN CYBER SPACE 913 
the U.N. Security Council and the courts will have a useful tool by which to 
judge the actions of the state using force. Such a tool would be very useful in 
further developing the law in this area. 
B. Criteria for the Victim State and the Target State 
First, to set forth a basic assumption as part of the foundation for the 
criteria, it will likely be impractical to dictate a specific agreed-upon burden of 
proof with respect to the level of certainty about the threat a victim state must 
face before using force in another state. However, a minimum threshold of 
good faith by the victim state is warranted. In following a standard, especially 
if that standard has specific content, a victim state could use the standard to 
support an argument of its good faith efforts. 
The following criteria are offered to a victim state deliberating whether to 
use force in self-defense against a non-state actor in another state’s territory. 
These criteria are also offered to the target state assessing the legality of a use 
of force in its territory by the victim state. As cyber conflict becomes more of a 
reality, these criteria may prove useful as states assess whether to use force in 
response to cyber attacks. 
1. Prior Notification to the Security Council 
A victim state should report a serious use of force within its territory by a 
non-state actor to the U.N. Security Council whether or not it has decided to 
use force in self-defense. This provides that victim state with the opportunity to 
articulate its assessment of the threat level it perceives, offering the Security 
Council all relevant information that it may be able to provide. This can also 
serve to put the target state on notice that it may be considering the use of force 
in self-defense. When providing information on the threat, the victim state 
should describe the following relevant details: (1) the geographic scope and 
intensity of the non-state actor’s past and current activities against the victim 
state and any other states the actors have targeted; (2) the sophistication of the 
attacks and any information that indicates potential future attacks from the 
actor; (3) the characteristics and number of actors operating within the target 
state as well as the level of seniority of those actors operating in that area; (4) 
the imminence of any future attacks; and (5) any links between the non-state 
actor and the target state. 
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2. Prior Notice to the Target State: Seek Consent or Cooperation from the 
Target State 
A victim state should report serious use of force within its territory by a 
non-state actor to the target state. Putting the target state directly on notice 
avoids any controversy over whether the state had “actual” versus 
“constructive” knowledge of the ongoing threats from within its territory. 
Although there is a debate as to whether actual knowledge of the threat is 
required before the victim state responds to the threat, this step would clearly 
resolve any disagreement about knowledge by the target state. This is also the 
opportunity for the victim state to provide a direct threat assessment to the 
target. Especially if the victim state did not notify the U.N. Security Council 
and provide a threat assessment then, or if the threat assessment was not made 
public at the time, the victim state should provide this information to the target 
state. 
If the victim state obtains the consent of the target state to use force within 
its territory, the victim state would not need to go through any further inquiry 
with respect to the criteria offered here. Under international law, as previously 
discussed, consent by the target state is an exception to the prohibition to use 
force against another state.444 Furthermore, if the target state denies its consent, 
the denial can be relevant in assessing the other factors of the criteria below. 
The request for consent alone, even if denied, may minimize international 
complaints if the victim state ultimately uses force unilaterally. 
3. Request that the Target State Address the Threat and Provide a 
Reasonable Amount of Time in Which to Do It 
By providing a threat assessment to the target state, the victim state has 
assisted the target state in seeking to address the threat. The victim state can 
request that the target state arrest individuals, eject them from the territory, 
turn them over to the victim state, or use forcible measures to stop the threat. In 
making the request, the victim state could provide specific information, 
including intelligence information, that would assist the target state in fulfilling 
its obligation to address the threat. For example, the victim state may have 
intelligence information about the specific location of the non-state actors. 
 
 444 Michael Byers, Letting the Exception Prove the Rule, 17 ETHICS & LEGAL AFF., March 2003, at 9, 14 
(noting the “undisputed fact that a state can freely consent to having foreign armed forces on its territory”). 
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However, this step would not necessarily be required as the victim state 
assessed the facts. For instance, if the victim state had credible information that 
the target state would warn the non-state actor and not take steps to stop the 
threat, the victim state would not be required to provide this notice and a 
request to the target state. The victim state could take a number of factors into 
consideration before deciding whether to provide the information to the target 
state requesting that it take action. The victim state could, in this situation, 
consider whether the target state had previously made public statements in 
support of the non-state actors or provided actual support to them even after an 
prior incident. It could also consider whether that state, because of domestic 
pressure, would not likely take any action against the actors. For example, if 
the domestic political pressures were obviously such that the state would not 
be able to use its resources against the actors without great political cost or 
upheaval, the victim state might decide not to request help from the target 
state. The victim state, however, would likely receive international 
condemnation if it failed to make such a request. 
The burden here is on the target state to do something or provide relevant 
responsive information to the victim state. The burden is shifted to the target 
state to show certain facts since it has the greatest access to the facts. As the 
ICJ has noted: 
[T]he fact of this exclusive territorial control exercised by a State 
within its frontiers has a bearing upon the methods of proof available 
to establish the knowledge of that State as to such events. By reason 
of this exclusive control, the other State, the victim of a breach of 
international law, is often unable to furnish direct proof of facts 
giving rise to responsibility. Such a State should be allowed a more 
liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence.445 
In making such a request to the target state, the victim state must assess what 
reasonable amount of time would be appropriate to allow the state to resolve 
the threat. Much of this decision would rely on the past practices of the target 
state as well as an assessment of its actual capabilities to do anything. For 
example, if the target state had limited or ineffective law enforcement, 
intelligence, or military tools to use, or if it lacked the political will or 
domestic criminal laws, then the victim state would likely not have to allow 
much time to pass before taking action. What constitutes a reasonable amount 
of time would also depend on the imminence and gravity of the threat. If the 
 
 445 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 18 (Apr. 9). 
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threat was serious and imminent, with “no moment for deliberation,”446 or if 
another attack was already being planned, the victim state might have no other 
choice but to act in a proportionate manner to the threat without asking for 
assistance from the target state. 
4. Reasonably Assess the Target State’s Control and Capacity Within Its 
Territory To Prevent or Stop the Threat 
If the victim state has reservations about the target state’s ability to stop the 
threats based upon limited law enforcement, intelligence, or military 
capabilities, the victim state must make a reasonable assessment about the 
likelihood that the target state could actually have an impact on stopping the 
threat, even if it wanted to. For example, it might be the case that the area in 
which the threat is operating is in a location where the state has no power or no 
ability to control. In the cyber context, if a state does not have legal authority 
over its Internet Service Providers to stop malware from being launched from 
its territory, then it will likely not be able to stop the cyber attacks. If it lacks 
law enforcement tools or does not have any domestic legislation criminalizing 
hacking, it will be limited in how it stops such cyber threats. A review of a 
target’s domestic laws and criminal investigative authorities would be relevant 
for a determination of its actual control over its territory. 
If the victim state publicly provides information describing the lack of 
control that a target state has over the private entities or corporations that may 
be responsible for the cyber attacks, for example, the victim state may lessen 
the international criticism for its use of force. If the target state has failed to 
pass any effective cyber security measures that attempt to prevent harmful 
malware from transiting or being launched from its territory, the victim state 
will likely have a stronger case that the state is unable to stop or prevent 
threats. In this regard it is important that the United States continues to work 
with the private sector in sharing cyber threat information and seeking to take 
domestic action to minimize harmful cyber operations emanating from the 
United States and harming others in another state territory.” 
Reviewing the target state’s capacity and control within its territory in this 
manner will reflect positively on the victim state as it is conducting due 
diligence in assessing the need to use force to stop the threat. Ultimately, the 
target state will need to show that it has taken due care in its efforts to prevent 
 
 446 Caroline Letters, supra note 356, at 198. 
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and stop attacks against the victim state.447 Although preventing all cyber 
malware from being launched from a state’s territory may be impossible, the 
test would not require that all such incidents be prevented; rather, the target 
state would need to show it has taken concrete steps to minimize or eliminate 
the threats. It may be that the more serious the threat, the less likely the victim 
state will be able to deal with it if it lacks the means. Under these 
circumstances, the target state should be willing to accept the victim state’s 
help in stopping the attacks. 
5. Reasonably Assess the Target State’s Proposed Means To Stop the 
Threat 
Although it may be unlikely that a target state provides a proposal for 
stopping the threat, in the case that it does, the victim state must reasonably 
assess whether the offered proposal will be effective and sufficient.448 In 
reviewing any such proposal, the victim state would have the opportunity to 
gauge whether the state is able and willing to stop the threat. Based on the 
information presented, the test would be what a “reasonable state” believes 
would achieve the goal of stopping the threat.449 Whatever one may believe a 
“reasonable state” is, in this context, a reasonable state would review the 
proposal in good faith considering what it believes to be necessary steps to stop 
the threat and the limitations that any state would likely have, given the 
circumstances. 
As has been recognized with terrorism, it is even more unlikely with cyber 
attacks that a target state will fully be able to stop all threats originating from 
its territory. In the case of cyber attacks, most of the infrastructure that cyber 
attacks will traverse is owned and operated by the private entities and not the 
government. Although the victim state must decide the proposed plan is 
sufficient to meet the threat, once a victim state accepts a proposal from the 
target state, it is obligated to review the plan in good faith. If a victim state 
fails to do this, it likely that its use of force would not be seen as legitimate. 
 
 447 The Group of Experts that drafted the Tallinn Manual was unable to reach consensus on whether a 
State would be in violation of its obligation to prevent harm to another State from its territory if the State failed 
to “use due care in supervising cyber activities on its territory” and was unaware of the actions in question (the 
State should have known) versus the State being in violation of the obligation when it actually knows of the 
attack. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 18 (manuscript r. 5, para. 11). 
 448 See id. (manuscript r. 5, para. 4). 
 449 See Schmitt, supra note 14, at 40 (noting that “reasonable states do not act precipitously, nor do they 
remain idle as indications that an attack is forthcoming become deafening”). 
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6. Reasonably Evaluate Prior Interactions with the Target State and the 
Target State’s Prior Interactions with the Non-State Actors 
In order to assess the target state’s willingness to respond to the threat, the 
victim state should review the target state’s responses to any prior requests to 
stop the threats from this particular non-state actor or other similar non-state 
actors that had been operating from within the target state. It would be 
important that any past incidents of non-state actors conducting harmful 
operations from the target state’s territory be reported to the U.N. Security 
Council and the target state, to ensure that a historical record is made. This 
way, any victim states could refer to the past incidences to draw inferences 
about the likelihood of the target state responding to the request to stop the 
threat. Even if non-state actors are not the same, but ones conducting the same 
type of harmful actions against other states (i.e., botnet attacks), a victim state 
can draw inferences from past cases in assessing the current chances of the 
target state taking action against a threat. 
Prior warnings provided to the target state, regardless of whether any 
victim state used force in the prior cases, serve to show a trend in the target 
state’s behavior and are relevant in assessing whether the state is truly willing 
to respond to the threat. Particularly if the prior requests have gone unanswered 
by the target state, the victim state can draw some strong inferences against the 
state’s willingness to take the threats seriously. 
If a target state has never before had a serious cyber attack launched from 
its territory by a non-state actor, the victim state should be hesitant to conclude, 
without further information, that the target state is unwilling or unable to 
address the threat. In the case in which a victim state is contemplating the use 
of anticipatory self-defense against the territory of another state, the victim 
state must be especially careful because there may be no historical evidence of 
attacks launched from the target state. The accuracy of the victim state’s 
information related to the seriousness and location of the threat within the 
target state will be especially important under these circumstances. 
7. Evaluating the Victim State’s Responsive Measure To Use Force: 
Proper Purpose, Last Resort, Proportionality, and Balance of 
Consequences. 
In determining whether to use force in self-defense, the victim state should 
also evaluate the remedial measures that it is considering. First, the victim state 
must make an honest assessment of the nature, scale, and scope of the harm 
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that its use of force will cause. It must be clear that the primary purpose of the 
use of force is to stop the threat in question. Second, in using force in self-
defense, the victim state must always make a determination that its recourse to 
force in the specific case was the necessary measure at the time, given the 
circumstances, in order to stop the attacks or prevent further ones from 
materializing. If the state reasonably believes that there are other alternatives 
aside from using force, then the state must pursue those options before using 
force. Third, the victim state must determine that the force used is of the scale, 
duration, and intensity that is minimally necessary to meet the threat. And 
fourth, an assessment must be made as to the reasonable chance of the use of 
force being successful in meeting the threat in question with the consequences 
of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction, to include 
potential injuries to innocent third parties. 
 
